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DU MYSTERE A L'HORIZON APOPHATIQUE DE LA THEOLOGIE EN ORIENT :  
L'ANTINOMIE AU DELÀ DE LA THEOLOGIE NEGATIVE DE L'OCCIDENT

TRADUCTION  
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PARTIE I, CHAPITRE I, SECTION II

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« Apophemi » (Αποφέμι) voudrait dire « nier »... La théologie apophatique – dans ce sens – partira de l'approfondissement de ce que « Dieu n'est pas » (pas qu'on nie toute parole de Dieu)<sup>1</sup>, laissant ainsi de côté la méthodologie de l'analogie. L'expérience chrétienne plus radicale de la foi est celle de la diversité de Dieu. Autrement dit, on refuse d'appliquer à Dieu les attributs pris du monde humain. Même et surtout les dogmes de la foi sont des formulations apophatiques, sous une forme verbale négative pour mieux exprimer l'impossibilité de rationaliser son énonciation<sup>2</sup>. Le monde chrétien occidental, même dans ses représentants romains officiels, voit dans la voie apophatique la seule typologie de 'religion mystique' où la connaissance n'est plus importante, comme le serait le mouvement religieux 'New Age'<sup>3</sup>. La voie apophatique serait – qui sait – un mode de renoncer à la rationalité et à la connaissance dans une attitude d'humiliation des facultés mentales ? Ou bien elle est une voie diverse pour

<sup>1</sup> Y Spiteris, *Palamas Gregorio*, in AA. VV., *Dizionario dei teologi*, Casale Monferrato 1998, pp. 962-965; Item: *Apophatic Theology*, in FARLEX ENCYCLOPEDIA, *TheFreeDictionary.com*, in «Internet» 2004, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/apopemptic> - item apophatism: «Apophatic theology is a system of by describing what God is *not*, rather than by describing what God *is*. It recognizes that because God by definition is utterly beyond this universe and outside the bounds of what humans can experience with their, other tools and categories are needed. Rather than producing straightforward, positive assertions about the nature of God, it speaks by way of negation. Making positive statements about the nature of God is sometimes called 'cataphatic theology'. Apophatic theology played an important role early in the history of Christianity. Three theologians who emphasized the importance of negative theology to an orthodox understanding of God, were, John Chrysostom, and Basil the Great. John of Damascus also employed it when he wrote that positive statements about God reveal 'not the nature, but the things around the nature.' It continues to be particularly prominent in Eastern Christianity (see Gregory Palamas), and is used to balance cataphatic theology. Apophatic statements are crucial to all orthodox Christian theology. God is described negatively as not a creation (uncreated), not definable in terms of space (infinite), invisible, beyond the reach of understanding (incomprehensible), whose being is not conceptually confinable to assumptions based on time (eternal), etc. In other words, God's essence cannot be spoken of (ineffable), and can only be compared to what it is not (incomparable). In sum, Christianity teaches by apophatic theology that, it is not necessary or even possible to know the essence of God; knowledge of God is true knowledge, when it is limited to what is revealed, and does not presume to venture beyond this. In contrast, some traditions in Christianity make prolific use of a concept called *analogia entis* (Analogy of being). By use of the analogy of being, known things and ideas are conceptually compared or projected toward a limiting concept which comprehends all possible, derivative or lesser versions of that ultimate idea. By finding relevant similarity and irrelevant dissimilarity, something of the being of God can be known. Apophatic theology is critical of this approach, presupposing that it is doomed to result in false, idolatrous conclusions, when applied to the discovery of the being of God».

<sup>2</sup> A. Nichols, *Appendix: The Idea of Doctrinal Development in Eastern Orthodox Theology*, in «Internet» 2005, <http://www.christendom-awake.org/pages/anichols/fromnewman2.html>: «In Eastern Orthodox theology, the idea of dogma possesses specific characteristics of its own - owing to its special relationship with the doctrine of the Spirit, with the Orthodox teaching on Tradition, with the theology of the Councils, and with the notion of the infallibility of the Church as a whole. In this, Orthodox theology has, most notably, preserved one vital feature of the primitive Christian concept of dogma, namely, its inseparable relationship with the liturgical life of the Church. Negatively, this leads Orthodox spokesmen to draw attention to the apophatic character of dogma. Dogma's negative form (in ruling out certain avenues of thought as *cul-de-sac*) expresses a self-conscious inadequacy of the human mind before the Christian mystery. Dogma does not exhaust the fullness of revelation, nor that of Christian experience. Put positively: dogma is, in the words of Paul Evdokimov, the 'verbal icon of truth', a symbol of the indescribable mystery, [1] Dogma upholds the mystery; it leads into it; and it expresses it, but apophatically - as in the celebrated case of the dogmatic *horos* of Chalcedon, with its four negative qualifications of the Union. The making of dogma contributes to the keeping of the Church's unity, yet new definition has never been considered as an aim in itself. Rather is it an extraordinary measure directed against disruption of that unity by false teaching».

(I. W. Evdokimov, *L'Orthodoxie* (Neuchâtel 1959).)

<sup>3</sup> J. Ratzinger, *Interreligious Dialogue and Jewish-Christian Relations*, in «Internet» 2005, <http://www.geocities.com/romcath1/DialogJudaism.html>: «By contrast, mystical religion, with its rigorously apophatic theology, makes no claim to know the divine; religion is no longer defined in terms of positive content, hence, in terms of sacred institutions. Religion is reduced entirely to mystical experience, a move which also rules out a priori any clash with scientific reason. New Age is the proclamation, as it were, of the age of mystical religion. The rationality of this kind of religion depends on its suspension of epistemological claims. In other words, such religion is essentially tolerant, even as it affords man the liberation from the limitations of his being that he needs in order to live and to endure his finitude».

accueillir pleinement le 'différent' du mystère, 'retrouvant' même la pure rationalité transfigurée par le divin ?

La pensée grecque classique avait déjà compris des allusions à l'inadéquation de l'esprit humain face à la vérité divine<sup>1</sup>. Il semble justement que l'occident chrétien ne réussit pas à accepter cette voie non systématiquement rationnelle sinon comme expression renforcée des « limites » de la créature, qui séparent le divin de l'humain<sup>2</sup>. Pour l'orient, la parole ultime du théologien ne peut être que l'*apophasis*, comme l'enseigne la grande tradition orientale. Non seulement parce que (selon ce que affirme Grégoire de Nysse) « chaque concept forgé par l'intellect pour tenter de rejoindre et pénétrer la nature divine ne parvient qu'à produire une idole de Dieu, non à le faire connaître » ; mais aussi parce qu'il faut « crucifier » avec le Christ son propre penser, pour que celui-ci soit saisi par l'Esprit et conduit par lui à pénétrer « les profondeurs du mystère de Dieu », comme lui seul peut et sait le faire (1Co.2, 9-12). Ce sera à Grégoire Palamas de développer l'intention apophasique orientale, avec la clarté sur la distinction entre l'essence divine et les énergies créées (3<sup>ème</sup> concile de Constantinople, 1351)<sup>3</sup>.

L'*apophasis* devient le milieu dans lequel se rencontrent, et se vivent réciproquement, deux mouvements nécessaires de l'intelligence théologique : l'ascension mystique, vers le haut, et la capacité humaine de rendre raison – la spéculation dialectique – vers le bas. En ce sens l'intelligence du chrétien, identifiée avec le Christ (« ce n'est plus moi qui vit, mais Christ qui vit en moi », Ga.12, 20), est la même que celle du Christ : « nous avons la pensée du Christ » (1Co. 2, 16). L'occident se préoccupait d'une autre confrontation : pas le risque de rationalisation du mystère mais le « danger mystérieux » de l'intuition religieuse plus profonde (considérablement présente dans l'orient archaïque). L'orient ne se laissera pas conditionner par ce type de réserve mais visera selon son mode sur ce qui puisse rendre spécifique l'intention chrétienne dans le « différent » du mystère et démontrera majeure circonspection face à la rationalisation. D'une part, on soulignera l'indissolubilité entre Dieu

<sup>1</sup> G. P. Stamatellos, *Review: Vayos Liapis, Agnôstos Theos. Horia tês anthrôpinês gnôsis stous Prosôkratikus kai ston Oidipoda Turanno*, (Athens: Stigme, 2003 (Pp. 128)), in «Internet» 2004, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2003.12.29, <http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2005/2005-07-06.html>: «In particular, L. focuses on the antithesis between the imperfection of human knowledge and the perfection of the divine mind. His main position is that ignorance of divinity is based on the nature of human and divine cognition in that the problem of divine knowledge in the Presocratics and Sophocles does not rest on a quantitative difference between humans and God (while humans have limited knowledge, God knows everything), but *qualitative* (God transcends reality as a different entity with unlimited capabilities and intelligence). The divine mind is manifest in another world, where human thought is not only incomparable but also different in ontological terms. God and humans should not be conceived as the two extreme points of the same ontological and epistemological line, where human thought tends to zero and divine intelligence to infinite, but as two parallel lines, which can never meet (p. 18). On this basis, L. interprets the gnosiological supremacy of God in terms of an early apophatism found in Presocratic and Sophoclean thought (pp. 18-19) and later in the apophatism and ineffability of the One in Plotinus (i.e. language cannot tell us what the One is, only what is not). Following the natural theology of the Presocratics, the Plotinian One is what it is, free of internal limitations and independent of external relations and complexities. Plotinus' demonstration of the One's ineffability influenced later Neoplatonic thought but more importantly the 'negative theology' developed in such early Christian authors as Dionysius Aeropagita and Johannes Chrysostomus. L. concludes that the transcendental otherness of the divine nature has two important results: (1) only divine knowledge is true and complete knowledge; human knowledge is delusive and imperfect; (2) human knowledge of the divine cannot be fully achieved but is necessarily limited and fragmentary. To justify his position, L. divides his book into two sections. In the first (pp. 17-72), he investigates the difference between divine and human knowledge in Presocratic theories of knowledge and Sophoclean apophatism, while in the second (pp. 81-109) he applies the results and conclusions of the first section to Sophocles' tragedy *Oedipus Tyrannus*».

<sup>2</sup> È caratteristica l'affermazione di Giovanni Paolo II in questo senso, lasciando poco spazio a una tale teologia nella prospettiva della comunione romana e lasciando fuori causa - a questo punto - le promesse di 'divinizzazione' che la dinamica apofatica rende possibile. Jean Paul II, *Lettre apostolique "Orientale lumen"*, Cité du Vatican 1995, p. 34 n° 16: «C'est ainsi que naît ce qui est appelé l'apophasisme de l'Orient chrétien: plus l'homme grandit dans la connaissance de Dieu, plus il le perçoit comme mystère inaccessible, insaisissable dans son essence. Il ne faut pas confondre cela avec un mysticisme obscur dans lequel l'homme se perd dans des réalités impersonnelles énigmatiques. Au contraire, les chrétiens d'Orient s'adressent à Dieu comme au Père, au Fils, au Saint-Esprit, personnes vivantes, tendrement présentes, auxquelles ils adressent une doxologie liturgique solennelle et humble, majestueuse et simple. Ils perçoivent pourtant que c'est surtout en se laissant éduquer à un silence d'adoration que l'on peut approcher cette présence, car au sommet de la connaissance et de l'expérience de Dieu, il y a sa transcendance absolue. Plus qu'à travers une méditation systématique, on y parvient à travers l'assimilation orante de l'Écriture et de la Liturgie. Dans cette humble acceptation des limites de la créature face à la transcendance infinie d'un Dieu qui ne cesse de se révéler comme le Dieu Amour, Père de notre Seigneur Jésus Christ, dans la joie de l'Esprit Saint, je vois exprimée l'attitude de la prière et la méthode théologique que l'Orient préfère et continue à offrir à tous ceux qui croient au Christ».

<sup>3</sup> Y. Spiteris, *Palamas Gregorio*, in AA. VV., *Dizionario dei teologi*, Casale Monferrato 1998, pp. 962-965.

et l'humanité<sup>1</sup>. D'autre part, le mystère divin se présente comme un abîme non parcourable et insurmontable<sup>2</sup>. Cette spécificité s'exprime comme antinomie qui inclut l'indissociabilité et l'inaccessibilité entre l'humanité et Dieu. Il ne manque que celui qui déterminera dans les événements polémiques de la période byzantine du XI<sup>e</sup> siècle le tournant qui porte l'« orient » à choisir une priorité théologique pas centré sur la rationalisation comme advint en occident<sup>3</sup>. En outre, le sens de la « différence » assume tout autre teneur si on considère la réalité humaine comme prioritairement conditionnée par le mal (dans le « péché originel »), ou si on perçoit l'humain et le créé en soi comme constitutivement expression de l'image de Dieu. Les théologiens de la tradition orientale insistent sur cette perspective positive<sup>4</sup>. La réforme d'occident sera généralement identique avec une position de totale négativité sur la nature humaine. On sait – cependant – qu'une telle distorsion ne correspond pas à l'intention Luthérienne, laquelle s'inscrit le plus dans la ligne « paradoxale » d'approche au mystère

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<sup>1</sup> A. Theodorou, *Die Mystik in der orthodoxen Ostkirche*, in P. Bratsiotis (Her.), *Die orthodoxe Kirche in griechischer Sicht*, Stuttgart 1959, S. 177: «Durch die in den Evangelien dargestellte Person Jesu Christi empfängt die Mystik die klassische und ihr eigene Form. Gott und Mensch zeigen sich als untrennbar vereint. Die wirkliche Natur des Menschen, frei von Sünde und Leidenschaft, umfängt ihren Schöpfer. Der menschliche Wille folgt dem des göttlichen Logos und ordnet sich ihm ohne Zwang unter. In ihrer wahren Vereinigung mit Gott leuchtet die Natur des Menschen, gewinnt an Ansehen und erlangt die Vergottung. Der Mensch wird aus Gnaden Gott, ohne daß seine Natur verdrängt oder im göttlichen Wesen aufgelöst wird. Dies Leben in der Vereinigung mit dem Gott-Vater zeigt sich überreichlich im Leben des Herrn in seiner gottmenschlichen Person. Als das schuldlose Lamm Gottes wurde er von seinem Vater in die Welt gesandt, auf daß er die Sünde der Welt trage (Joh. 1, 29). Seine Speise ist, daß er den Willen des Vaters tue, der ihn gesandt hat, daß er sein Werk vollende (Joh. 4, 34). Er lebt, weil der Vater lebt (Joh. 6, 57), er ist eins mit dem Vater (Joh. 10, 30), er ist im Vater (Joh. 29; 14). Da in Christus der Vater bleibt, tut er seine Werke (Joh. 14, 10). Die Herrlichkeit des Sohnes ist gleichzeitig die Herrlichkeit des Vaters (Joh. 13, 31-32), niemand erkennt den Vater, es sei denn durch den Sohn (Joh. 14, 7), und wer den Sohn gesehen hat, hat auch den Vater gesehen (Joh. 14, 9). Das ewige Leben liegt darin begründet, daß man den allein wahren Gott erkennt und den, den er gesandt hat, Jesus Christus (Joh. 17, 3). Die direkt innigste Verbindung mit dem Gott-Vater zeigt sich überreichlich im irdischen Leben des Gottmenschen».

<sup>2</sup>A. Theodorou, *Die Mystik in der orthodoxen Ostkirche*, in P. Bratsiotis (Her.), *Die orthodoxe Kirche in griechischer Sicht*, Stuttgart 1959, S. 188: «Wie bereits gesagt, spielt die Aufhebung der absoluten Transzendenz des göttlichen Wesens in der Lehre der griechischen Kirchenväter von der Vereinigung Gottes mit dem Menschen eine ungeheure Rolle. Sie verstehen die göttliche Wesenheit als alles Physische überragend, sie ist infinit, und so ist sie für den Verstand vollkommen unfaßbar, geschweige denn, daß er sich mit ihr vereinigen könnte. Zwischen der göttlichen Wesenheit und allen Geschöpfen besteht mit Ausnahme der reinen pneumatischen Wesen und Naturen ein unüberbrückbarer ontologischer Abgrund. Als absoluter, ungeschaffener und ewiger Geist ist Gott für den natürlichen Verstand völlig unverständlich und unerreichbar (\*). Diese Tatsache ist von größter Wichtigkeit, insofern als sich die Kirchenväter in ihren mystischen Anschauungen und in ihrem Leben vor jeglicher Gefahr einer Auflösung der menschlichen Natur im Meer des göttlichen Wesens hüten. Dieser Gefahr ist die außerchristliche Mystik oft erlegen. Die Vereinigung mit Gott und die Vergottung des Menschen in Gott übersteigt keinesfalls die natürliche Grenze der Schöpfung, sondern sie ist ein Werk der Gnade Gottes, das auf der ethischen Ebene liegt, und sie korrespondiert mit der menschlichen Natur. Die Vereinigung Gottes mit dem Menschen vollzieht sich nicht im göttlichen Wesen selbst, das wie bereits gesagt, für die gesamte geschaffene Natur vollkommen unerreichbar ist, sondern sie vollzieht sich in den ungeschaffenen göttlichen Energien, die aus dem göttlichen Wesen hervorgehen und es nach außen hin der Natur offenbaren (\*\*). Die "übersubstantiellen Strahlen", die bis zu den Geschöpfen herabkommen, machen diese des göttlichen Lebens teilhaftig und geleiten den Menschen zur Gotteserkenntnis, indem sie gleichzeitig in die "Wolke der Unwissenheit" eindringen. Dort verbirgt sich in der Tiefe der Ruhe und des Schweigens und jenseits alles Seins, das Mysterium der "prima causa", das Geheimnis des dreieinigen Gottes».

(\*) Gregor v. Nazianz, Migne P. G. 35, I r64. Cyrill v. Alexandrien, Migne P. G. 75, 888 B. Anastasius Synaiticus, Migne P. G. 89, 77 CD. Basilus d. Gr., Migne P. G. 32, 6g B. Chrysostomus, Migne P. G. 53, 78 u. a. / (\*\*\*) Vgl. Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita., *De div. nom.*, Migne P. G. 3, 64g B. Basilus d. Gr., *Adv. Eunom.*, Migne P. G. 29, 681 C-684A.

<sup>3</sup> G. Cioffari, *Ricerca teologica e illuminazione dello Spirito nella teologia bizantina del secolo XI*, in «Nicolaus», 1980 n° 2, p. 349: «Ma più importante del suo pensiero è il processo e la condanna che egli subì. Contro le sue "empietà pagane" il 13 marzo 1082 domenica dell'ortodossia, dall'ambone di S. Sofia (dopo gli anatemi del Synodikon contro gli iconoclasti) furono letti altri 11 anatemi, in due dei quali veniva fatto espressamente il suo nome. La condanna di Giovanni Italos dev'essere considerata di grandissima importanza per il destino della teologia bizantina. Se per l'imperatore significava liberarsi di un personaggio scomodo, per la Chiesa significava una scelta di un metodo teologico a preferenza di un altro. Mentre la teologia di Simeone e Niceta era destinata a perpetuarsi, soprattutto nello sviluppo dell'esicismo, quella di Psello e di Italos era destinata d'ora in poi ad essere guardata sempre con sospetto, quasi che in quest'ultima fiorissero le empietà pagane, la pretesa saggezza dei filosofi pagani, gli studi ellenistici, e quei saggi elleni "che furono i primi eresiarchi". Da quel momento la teologia bizantina imbocca una via che diverge sempre più da quella occidentale nella misura in cui quest'ultima, grazie ad Anselmo d'Aosta, Abelardo, Alberto Magno e Tommaso d'Aquino, sosterrà che la verità si trova all'estremità della ricerca razionale coincide con la verità che ci è stata rivelata e che ci rivela ancora lo Spirito. Inversamente dall'Oriente, la ricerca in Occidente si afferma, mentre è la mistica ad essere guardata con sospetto».

<sup>4</sup> G. Cioffari, *Ricerca teologica e illuminazione dello Spirito nella teologia bizantina del secolo XI*, in «Nicolaus», 1980 n° 2, p. 349: «Ma più importante del suo pensiero è il processo e la condanna che egli subì. Contro le sue "empietà pagane" il 13 marzo 1082 domenica dell'ortodossia, dall'ambone di S. Sofia (dopo gli anatemi del Synodikon contro gli iconoclasti) furono letti altri 11 anatemi, in due dei quali veniva fatto espressamente il suo nome. La condanna di Giovanni Italos dev'essere considerata di grandissima importanza per il destino della teologia bizantina. Se per l'imperatore significava liberarsi di un personaggio scomodo, per la Chiesa significava una scelta di un metodo teologico a preferenza di un altro. Mentre la teologia di Simeone e Niceta era destinata a perpetuarsi, soprattutto nello sviluppo dell'esicismo, quella di Psello e di Italos era destinata d'ora in poi ad essere guardata sempre con sospetto, quasi che in quest'ultima fiorissero le empietà pagane, la pretesa saggezza dei filosofi pagani, gli studi ellenistici, e quei saggi elleni "che furono i primi eresiarchi". Da quel momento la teologia bizantina imbocca una via che diverge sempre più da quella occidentale nella misura in cui quest'ultima, grazie ad Anselmo d'Aosta, Abelardo, Alberto Magno e Tommaso d'Aquino, sosterrà che la verità si trova all'estremità della ricerca razionale coincide con la verità che ci è stata rivelata e che ci rivela ancora lo Spirito. Inversamente dall'Oriente, la ricerca in Occidente si afferma, mentre è la mistica ad essere guardata con sospetto».

(traduisant l'antinomie avec ce type de reformulation) <sup>1</sup>. Plus récemment, la théologie occidentale de communion romaine s'est trouvé un porte-voix qui rappelle de manière convergente avec l'orient la référence au dépassement de la rationalisation <sup>2</sup> exagérée et à la valorizzazione de l'«antinomie» dans le sens orientale <sup>3</sup>. Le mystère n'est pas le « non » devant

<sup>1</sup> A. Hasler, *Lutero nei testi scolastici di teologia cattolica*, in □ Concilium □, 1976 n° 8, p. 148: «Un'ulteriore differenza nei confronti della scolastica è costituita dalla struttura di pensiero dialettico-paradossale di Lutero, che consiste nella tensione continua di abbracciare con un solo sguardo gli opposti. La formula 'insieme' penetra tutti gli angoli della dottrina luterana della giustificazione. La natura umana è totalmente corrotta eppure interamente conservata; la ragione è una prostituta e al tempo stesso il più grande dono di Dio; il cristiano è un signore libero che dispone di tutte le cose e non è sottomesso a nessuno, ed è altrettanto un servo disponibile di tutte le cose e sottomesso a tutti; è giusto e peccatore, ha la certezza (certitudo) della salvezza, ma non ne ha la sicurezza (securitas); viene giustificato soltanto per fede eppure aspetta un giudizio in base alle opere. A differenza di questo modo di pensare, la scolastica ha cercato di fissare la realtà in una rigorosa articolazione e organizzazione di concetti».

<sup>2</sup> A. Joos, *la priorità escatologica come anticipazione ecumenica nel pensiero di Rosmini: tra oriente, occidente e Riforma*, conferenza data a Rovereto, per il 200° della nascita di A. Rosmini, pro manuscripto, Roma 1997, p. 3-4: «L'ESCATOLOGIA COME SUPERAMENTO DI UNA TEOLOGIA RAZIONALIZZANTE: CONVERGENZA ECUMENICA NELLA CHIAVE DELLA ANTINOMIA. In che cosa consiste quella 'metodologia' escatologica con cui Rosmini entra a pieno titolo? Il XIX° secolo ha visto impostarsi il problema escatologico come confronto tra 'rivelazione' e 'ragione' (1). Lo slittamento razionalizzante o razionalistico sarà preso di mira con determinazione. Rosmini esce dalle prospettive 'moderniste' o 'anti-moderniste'; pochi se ne sono accorti nell'infuriare della controversia (2). Ecco che ritroviamo Rosmini con un convergente avvertimento: "Il nemico che a' nostri tempi insidia più pericolosamente la Chiesa cattolica è il razionalismo" (3). Tutto parte da una esaltazione sconsiderata del 'libero arbitrio': "Avendo dunque gli eretici... del secolo XVI sostenuto che il peccato originale avea distrutto interamente il libero arbitrio, alcuni teologi per opporsi loro caddero nell'estremo contrario, sostenendo che il peccato originale non avea né pure diminuito il libero arbitrio..." (4). L'avvertimento rosminiano raggiunge proprio quello dell'oriente riguardo all'occidente. Tutta la teologia apofatica -che nasce dalla originarietà ecclesiale- anticipa questo intuito rosminiano: la esagerata 'razionalità' (5), che sembra pervadere la teologia (anche se l'oriente non nega il valore della ragione (6)) ed interessarsi alla 'formalizzazione' della fede, lasciando al mistero la sfera 'non ufficiale' e 'orante' (liturgica) (7). Si dirà che l'occidente (per gli orientali 'tutto l'occidente', tra comunione romana e Riforma) è più razionalmente analitico, mentre l'oriente è più attirato verso la ricapitolazione di sintesi (8). Rosmini coglie tutto il rischio della razionalizzazione analitica nell'indicare il malinteso riguardo alla specificità stessa del linguaggio, ben più ampio dell'analisi razionale (9). "L'analisi divide, e la sintesi unisce..." (10). "Ma poiché l'uomo è limitato... dati al ragionare analitico e colti di bei frutti, tosto immagina e si persuade che quel solo metodo basti a tutto..." (11). Questa massima coerenza formale, o strutturale, o ufficiale, o teologica ha creato un'altro tipo di confronto: quello tra teologia anti-spirituale e spiritualità anti-teologica. Rosmini menziona questo significativo binomio: "l'educazione fu per lungo tempo in Europa e in Francia massimamente un misto di razionalismo teologico e di devozione" (12). Una simile ambiguità è chiaramente percepibile persino nella Riforma d'occidente dove l'intento 'formale', 'strutturale' ed 'ufficiale' scomparve. Rimase -comunque- quello teologico di fronte a quello spirituale (13). Vanno -forse- interpretati così le osservazioni del Rosmini sulle: "...sole forme esterne del protestantesimo... peccante per eccesso in magnificare l'ordine soprannaturale a distruzione dell'ordine naturale. Ma lo spirito del protestantesimo soffiava in direzione contraria..." (14). Rosmini converge anche con un intuito slavo-orientale: "è un pregiudizio volgare e crudele (e dovrebbe una volta cessare) il credere che gli ubriachi, i pazzi ed i bambini non facciano alcun uso affatto della loro ragione... anzi (l'uso) v'è egli attivissimo; ma per sventura non regolato nelle cose necessarie al vivere..." (15). Ecco che dalla semplicità evangelica nella non resistenza al male si intravede l'annientamento della 'pazzia' come gli "jurodivye" -pazzi per Cristo- che è protezione contro l'efficace razionalità con un altro "compito", permettendo un reale discernimento dello spirito (16), senza confondere "semplicità" e "primitivismo" (17): modo di ragionare 'diverso', non 'logico', paradosso evangelico o antinomia del essere divinizzati».

(1) G. Colzani, *L'escatologia nella teologia cattolica degli ultimi 30 anni*, in ASSOCIAZIONE TEOLOGICA ITALIANA, *L'escatologia contemporanea*, op. cit., pp. 85-87. / (2) Cfr L. Malusa, *Rosmini e le polemiche filosofiche dell'ottocento*, in AA. VV., *Rosmini, pensatore europeo*, Milano 1989, pp. 85-86. / (3) A. Rosmini, *Il razionalismo teologico*, in idem, *Opere di Antonio Rosmini*, vol. 43, Roma 1992, p. 35. / (4) *Ibidem*, p. 89. / (5) M. Azkoul, *what are the Differences between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism?*, (Reproduced with permission from The Orthodox Christian Witness), Vol. XXVII (48), Vol. XXVIII (6) and (8) (Copyright, 1994 St. Nectarius American Orthodox Church), in «Internet» 1996, [http://www.ocf.org/OrthodoxPage/reading/ortho\\_cath.html](http://www.ocf.org/OrthodoxPage/reading/ortho_cath.html). / (6) D. B. Clendenin, *A Protestant Examines Orthodoxy*, in «Internet» 1996, <http://www.ocf.org/TheChristianActivist/AProtestantExamines.html>; cfr A. Ugolnik, *The Illuminating Icon* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989); F. C. Copleston, *Philosophy in Russia* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986); Sergius Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church*, rev. ed. (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1988), chap. 11, "Orthodox Mysticism"; L. Shestov, *Speculation and Revelation*, trans. Bernard Martin (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1982); On Shestov see F. C. Copleston, *Russian Religious Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); A. S. Khomiakov, "On the Western Confessions of Faith," in Alexander Schmemmann, ed., *Ultimate Questions: An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1977), 29-69. / (7) W. E. Wiest, *The Centenary of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America: an Appreciation*, in A. J. Philippou (Ed.), *The Orthodox Ethos*, op. cit., p. 8. / (8) A. Gratieux, *Le mouvement slavophile à la veille de la révolution*, Paris 1953, p. 61-62. / (9) A. Quacquarelli, *Esame storico-critico*, in A. Rosmini, *Il linguaggio teologico*, in idem, *Opere di Antonio Rosmini*, n° 38, Roma 1975, p. 130. / (10) A. Rosmini, *Psicologia, libri dieci*, tomo II, in idem, *Scienze metafisiche*, vol. I, op. cit., p. 257, n° 1039. / (11) *Ibidem*, p. 285, n° 1113. / (12) Idem, *Il razionalismo teologico*, op. cit., p. 335. / (13) W. E. Wiest, *The Centenary of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America: an Appreciation*, in A. J. Philippou (Ed.), *The Orthodox Ethos*, Oxford 1964, p. 9. / (14) Il modo di esprimersi del Rosmini sulla Riforma d'occidente si iscrive ancora in una fraseologia tipica dell'epoca. Gli accenni polemici ed il linguaggio articolato nelle categorie di 'eresie' appaiono, oggi, superflui. Si guarderà -dunque- maggiormente ai brani dove l'autore tenta una interpretazione più personale del fenomeno. Occorre poi dire che i nostri fratelli della Riforma non sono neanche loro teneri verso se stessi e spesso mettono avanti i propri traversi senza ipocrisia. Cfr A. Rosmini, *Il razionalismo teologico*, op. cit., p. 42. / (15) A. Rosmini, *Il razionalismo teologico*, op. cit., p. 268. / (16) D. Čiževskij, *Storia dello spirito russo*, Firenze 1974, pp. 74-75, 136-138. / (17) N. Arsen'ev, *La piété russe*, Paris 1963, pp. 94-95.

<sup>3</sup> A. Joos, *la priorità escatologica come anticipazione ecumenica nel pensiero di Rosmini: tra oriente, occidente e Riforma*, conferenza data a Rovereto, per il 200° della nascita di A. Rosmini, pro manuscripto, Roma 1997, p. 4-5: «Indicando il malinteso della filosofia del suo tempo come confusione tra 'mistero' e 'contraddizione' (1), o della 'antinomia' presa per 'contraddizione' (come e. G. Da Hegel) (2), Rosmini propone di "conciliare le antinomie che appaiono nel pensiero umano" (3). Egli riapre la via alla originaria chiave dell'antinomia della teologia apofatica. La "imperfezione, cioè nell'esser essa (la cognizione) 'indistinta',... ci accorgiamo di percepire con essa TUTTO L'ESSERE, TUTTO IL BENE. L'oscurità di questa percezione indistinta..." potrebbe riallacciare tutto il pensiero rosminiano alle sorgenti apofatiche. Anzi, la Teosofia partirà "non dal 'dubbio metodico'... ma dalla 'ignoranza metodica'" (4). "Laonde a prima dote richiesta nel

*Teosofa... che egli non si vergogni di confessare essere immensamente più le cose che gli rimangono ignote...*" (5). La prospettiva apofatica orientale (6), chiamata in occidente -approssimativamente- negativa (7) è una teologia 'adorativa' più che esplicativa (8). L'antinomia parte dall'intuito che l'umano non corrisponde al divino, non c'è composizione razionale possibile tra il 'limitato' umano e l'incircoscivibile divino (9). Ovvero, secondo il nostro autore: "Dapertutto il concetto dell'ente è circondato d'antinomie... infinito... e finito, semplice... e composto..." (10). "Si presenta infatti come un'antinomia, che v'abbia un bene assoluto ed unico, e contemporaneamente molti beni finiti..." (11). La somma antinomia sarà dell'"unità perfetta... e insieme tre relazioni opposte..." (12). Per cogliere il passaggio dall'umano al divino, bisogna rompere la linearità della 'logica' mentale (13). Rosmini dirà: "Primieramente è un'antinomia il porre che una cosa sussista senza una ragion sufficiente, poiché la ragion sufficiente è il principio d'ogni esistenza..." (14). La non linearità si esprime come 'inconsoscibilità' di Dio: la conoscenza mentale esauriente sarebbe come un idolo sostituendo la rivelazione divina (15). La divinizzazione dell'umano (16) -compenetrazione tra il divino e l'umano, apparentemente impossibile- si attua non di meno in Cristo: "impossibile possibilità" per la mente umana o 'antinomia' (17), impossibilità razionale ma esperienza nella fede. La 'gioia del co-essere' o "Ananda" della prospettiva indiana originaria (con Cit o Figlio-coscienza, e Sat o Padre-essere) (18) sfocia dalla 'notte oscura' o dalla 'tragedia' dell'"uscire da se stessi": i due poli del dono d'amore (19). L'antinomia ci fa uscire dai parametri della coerenza umana, nel 'crollo' della compattezza umana: non una 'negazione dell'assurdo', ragione per credere ('credo quia absurdum'), da Tertulliano in poi (20). Di fronte all'antinomia "i deboli d'intelletto o gli immorali... passano dal dogmatismo volgare allo scetticismo... quelli che hanno una gran mente e un forte carattere morale... diventano per metà scettici e per metà dogmatici" (21). Anche l'intento luterico si iscrive nella linea 'paradossale' di approccio al mistero (22). Il mistero non è il 'no' di fronte a tutte le formulazioni umane (approccio di teologia strettamente negativa). Anzi "... la mente umana concepisce ciò che è negativo sotto una forma positiva, il nulla come un qualcosa, e che la negazione è un'affermazione in quanto alla forma" (23). "Ora l'atto del 'negare' appartiene alla facoltà che abbiamo denominato 'del giudizio' e 'dell'affermazione...'" (24). "Perocché la mente non solo cangia le sue negazioni in enti positivi... ma talora fa anche il contrario vestendo d'una forma negativa il positivo" (25). La razionalità può essere 'e' totalmente inadatta 'e' confermatamente integra (26), la persona umana è 'e' peccatrice 'e' giustificata ("simul...et"). L'antinomia -qui- si presenta come un 'e'-e': o cioè due estremi opposti che vengono accostati. "... Questa giustificazione non consiste nella sola remissione dei peccati... Da quel sentimento interiore nasce l'istinto dello Spirito Santo..." (27). 'Giusto e peccatore', questo abbinamento 'impossibile' è la chiave emblematica di ciò che Lutero cerca di non dissociare (28). La dimensione 'estrinseca' della giustificazione dalla 'sola grazia' e dalla 'sola fede' esplicita ulteriormente questo paradossale 'simul' luterico, un 'simul' come congiunzione nella discontinuità, non una insuperabile conflittualità: il linguaggio 'di discontinuità' della prospettiva luterana segue una via diversa del linguaggio 'trasformista' più ampiamente usato in ambito cattolico di comunione romana dell'epoca (29). La 'chiarezza' del discorso cattolico poteva facilmente portare -in una atmosfera di polemiche- a considerare confusa l'impostazione mentale luterana. L'antinomia dell'oriente, nella sua visuale apofatica non sarà un 'né'-né' (né la formulazione umana, né la sua negazione) proprio alla luce della non conflittualità tra mistero di Dio e prospetto umano. L'antinomia escatologica si esprime al di là del 'né'-né' dell'esito ultimo: antinomia di luce-tenebra nel mistero della beatitudine (30). Tocchiamo -a questo livello- la sfumatura specifica che distingue il paradosso dall'antinomia teologica. Ecco dunque la sostanza di una convergenza, dove 'oriente' e 'Riforma d'occidente' ritrovano una consonanza con l'occidente di comunione romana, nella sua riscoperta del 'mistero'... Rosmini apre un varco nella sua maturità teologica, che non sarà sempre facile da armonizzare con i suoi intenti precedenti».

(1) Cfr G. Morra, *Primato dell'ideologia e filosofia europea in Rosmini*, in AA. VV., *Rosmini, pensatore europeo*, Milano 1989, p. 113. / (2) A. Rosmini, *Teosofia*, vol. III, Roma 1938, p. P. 106. / (3) Idem, *Teosofia*, vol. I, Roma 1938, p. 49. / (4) *Ibidem*, p. 15. / (5) *Ibidem*, p. 20. / (6) P. Evdokimov, *L'Esprit Saint et la prière pour l'unité*, in AA. VV., *La prière pour l'unité*, Taizé 1969, pp. 18-19. / (7) J.-M. Chenu, *Peuple de Dieu dans le monde*, Paris 1965, pp. 155-156. / (8) O. Clément, *La rencontre de Jean Paul II et de Dimitrios* □, in «Service orthodoxe de presse», 1979 n° 43, p. 2. / (9) П. Флоренский, *Столп и утверждение истины*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, T. IV, / P. Florenskij, *La colonna e il fondamento della verità*, Москва 1917 / Milano 1974, стр. 159-160 / p. 207. / (10) A. Rosmini, *Teosofia*, vol. I, op. cit., p. 54. / (11) *Ibidem*, p. 56; cfr vol. VII (essere e fenomeno), Roma 1940, p. 51. / (12) Idem, *Teosofia*, vol. I, op. cit., p. 116. / (13) P. Evdokimov, *La connaissance de Dieu selon la tradition orientale*, Paris 1970, pp. 10-11. / (14) A. Rosmini, *Teosofia*, vol. I, op. cit., p. 50, cfr vol. II, op. cit., pp. 262-263. / (15) Gregorio di Nissa, *Sulla vita di Mosè*, in P. G., t. 44, col. 377; VI. Lossky, *Vision de Dieu*, Neuchâtel 1962, pp. 134-140; idem, *Théologie mystique de l'Eglise d'orient*, Paris 1944, pp. 31-32. / (16) P. I. Bratsiotis, *The fundamental Principles and main Characteristics of the Orthodox Church*, in A. J. Philippou, *The Orthodox Ethos*, op. cit., p. 26. / (17) S. Bulgakov, *Die Christliche Anthropologie*, in AA. VV., *Kirche, Staat und Mensch*, Genf 1937, S. 211-212; П. Флоренский, *Столп и утверждение истины*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, T. IV, / P. Florenskij, *La colonna e il fondamento della verità*, Москва 1917 / Milano 1974, стр. 159-160 / p. 207. / (18) F. Wilfred, *Beyond Settled Foundations*, Trichy 1993, pp. 50-52; cfr J. Monchanin, "The Quest of the Absolute", *Cross Currents*, 19 (1969) 87; etiam J. Monchanin, "Théologie et Mystique du Saint-Esprit", in «Dieu Vivant», 23 (1953), quoted in Henri De Lubac, *Images de l'Abbe' Monchanin*, op. cit., 116. / (19) С. Булгаков / S. Bulgakov, *Умеумель / Le Paraclét*, Таллин 1936 / Paris 1944, . стр. 123 / p. 74. / (20) D. B. Clendenin, *The Western Enthronement and Eastern Distrust of Rationalism* (This is excerpted from Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Western Perspective from Baker Books, Grand Rapids, MI.), in □Internet□ 1996, <http://www.ocf.org/TheChristianActivist/AProtestantExamines.html>; F. C. Copleston, *Philosophy in Russia* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 16; Sergius Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church*, rev. ed. (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1988), chap. 11, "Orthodox Mysticism."; L. Shestov, *Speculation and Revelation*, trans. Bernard Martin (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1982), 41, 21. On Shestov see Frederick C. Copleston, *Russian Religious Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), chap. 6; A. S. Khomiakov, "On the Western Confessions of Faith," in Alexander Schmemmann, ed., *Ultimate Questions: An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1977), ; R. Maddox, "John Wesley and Eastern Orthodoxy: Influences, Convergences, and Differences," *Asbury Theological Journal* 45.2 (Fall 1990): 29-53; and Howard Snyder, "John Wesley and Macarius of Egypt," *Asbury Theological Journal* 45.2 (Fall 1990): 55-60; I. Kireevsky, "Of the Necessity and Possibility of New Principles for Philosophy," in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Theological Academy, 1861), 318 (cited by Ugolnik, *Illuminating Icon*, 193). Cf. Vladimir Weidle, "Russia and the West," in Schmemmann, *Ultimate Questions*, 11-27. / (21) A. Rosmini, *Teosofia*, vol. III, op. cit., p. 52, cfr etiam pp. 148-149. / (22) A. Hasler, *Lutero nei testi scolastici di teologia cattolica*, in □Concilium□, 1976 n° 8, p. 148. / (23) A. Rosmini, *Psicologia, libri dieci*, tomo II, in idem, *Scienze metafisiche*, vol. I, in idem, *Opere di Antonio Rosmini, Psicologia/2*, vol. 9/A, Roma 1988, p. 258, n° 1045. / (24) A. Rosmini, *Psicologia, libri dieci*, tomo III, in idem, *Scienze metafisiche*, vol. I, in idem, *Opere di Antonio Rosmini, Psicologia/3*, vol. 10, Roma 1989, p. 166, n° 1607. / (25) *Ibidem*, p. 169, n° 1615. / (26) A differenza di ciò che fu detto perentoriamente dal relatore Staglianò sul rifiuto della ragione da parte di K. Barth. / (27) A. Rosmini, *Il razionalismo teologico*, op. cit., p. 305. / (28) A. Hasler, *Lutero nei testi scolastici di teologia cattolica*, in □Concilium□, 1976 n° 8, p. 148. / (29) LUTHERAN - ROMAN CATHOLIC DIALOGUE IN THE UNITED STATES, *Justification by Faith*, in □Origins□, 1983 n° 17, pp. 282 n° 24, 290 n° 96 (In speaking of the state of historical humanity Pope John Paul II has recently used the phrase, "status naturae lapsae simul et redemptae" [L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., Feb. 18, 1980, p. 1] / cfr Thomas Aquinas, ST, 1, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2). / (30) П. Флоренский, *Столп и утверждение истины*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, T. IV, / P. Florenskij, *La colonna e il fondamento della verità*, Москва 1917 / Milano 1974, стр. 249-250 / p. 305.

affirme paradoxalement que la rationalisation peut être « et » totalement inappropriée (pour traiter du mystère divin) « et » conformément intègre (pour gérer les vicissitudes humains). L'antinomie – ici – se présente comme un « et » - « et » : ou c'est – à – dire deux extrêmes opposés qui viennent à être approchés. Ce « *simul* » est une conjonction dans la discontinuité, non une grossière conflictualité où les extrêmes s'excluent réciproquement<sup>1</sup>. L'antinomie de l'orient, dans sa vision apophatique sera un « ni » - « ni » (ni la formulation humaine, ni sa négation) vraiment à la lumière de la conflictualité entre mystère de Dieu et perspective humaine.

## LA VOIE APOPHATIQUE DE L'ANTINOMIE

On soulignera l'irremplaçable perspective apophatique – de nature soit antique qu'orientale – pour n'importe quelle entreprise théologique<sup>2</sup>. En occident, les théologiens se sont – eux aussi – rendus compte de la nécessité d'une théologie « orientale » ou appelée de façon un peu approximativement négative<sup>3</sup>. On dira – au contraire – que la théologie orientale est apophatique dans le sens de sa marque « adorative » plus que explicative<sup>4</sup>. Ici aussi, on combinera facilement les catégories de « mysticisme » avec celles de l'apophatisme, en en faisant une espèce de formulation évasive de tout le domaine ecclésial...Le « saut apophatique » et le « mystère de l'Esprit » (peut-être aussi son énigme) ont diverses dimensions communes. La voie apophatique commence du paradoxe de la Trinité qui exprime « qui est Dieu » dans sa relation avec l'humain, sans vouloir le réduire à une des catégories humaines. Dans cette approche on trouve la confirmation de la non-conformité entre progressivité humaine et don gratuit et surabondant de la vie divinisante. C'est la conséquence directe de l'antinomie du mystère de Dieu : l'humain ne correspond pas au divin, il n'y a pas une composition rationnelle entre le limité humain et « l'incirconscrivable » divin<sup>5</sup>. Pour

<sup>1</sup> LUTHERAN - ROMAN CATHOLIC INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES, *Justification by Faith*, in «Origins», 1983 n° 17, p. 290 n° 96: «These different concerns entail notably different patterns of thought and discourse. The Catholic concerns are most easily expressed in the transformationist language appropriate to describing a process in which human beings, created good but now sinful, are brought to new life through God's infusion of saving grace. (\*) Grace, as the medieval adage has it, does not destroy but perfects nature. (\*\*) Lutheran ways of speaking, on the other hand, are shaped by the situation of sinners standing before God (coram Deo) and hearing at one and the same time God's words of judgment and forgiveness in law and gospel. Attention is here focused on this discontinuous, paradoxical and simultaneous double relation of God to the justified, not on the continuous process of God's transforming work».

(\*) In speaking of the state of historical humanity Pope John Paul II has recently used the phrase “*status naturae lapsae simul et redemptae*” (L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., Feb. 18, 1980, p. 1). / (\*\*) Thomas Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.

<sup>2</sup> P. Evdokimov, *L'Esprit Saint et la prière pour l'unité*, in AA. VV., *La prière pour l'unité*, Taizé 1969, pp. 18-19: «La théologie apophatique joue un rôle purificateur et préserve fortement les orientaux de toute tentation de réduire Dieu aux concepts, à ces ultimes et plus dangereuses idoles. "Nul ne peut voir Dieu et demeurer vivant", signifie pour les Pères: nul ne peut limiter Dieu par une formule. Dieu est divinement libre, ce qui veut dire essentiellement mystérieux. Qui peut évaluer la descente fulgurante du Verbe du sommet du silence éternel jusqu'au fond du gouffre infernal et sa remontée à la droite du Père? C'est aussi le même mystère qu'Il "traverse le mur de silence" et se manifeste à l'intérieur des parties séparées de la chrétienté. Les fontaines de la sainteté jaillissent du cœur de toute confession, transcendent les limites, leurs sommets s'unissent sans peine. Les saints dévoilent l'unité de la présence divine derrière la désunion humaine».

<sup>3</sup> J.-M. Chenu, *Peuple de Dieu dans le monde*, Paris 1965, pp. 155-156: «Dans le champ de la théologie, je ne mentionnerai qu'un des multiples cas de cette sensibilité spirituelle: le réveil de la "théologie négative", avec sa sévère critique de la conceptualisation de la Parole de Dieu, de Dieu lui-même, au bénéfice d'une communion réaliste avec le mystère du Christ et de Dieu, au-delà des paroles et des concepts, par ailleurs nécessaires et valables. Précisément, ces zones de la théologie négative, dans l'histoire de la pensée chrétienne (je pense à la théologie orientale, et à ses trop rares infiltrations en Occident), sont celles où fleurit le symbole, où prolifèrent les images, déconcertantes pour nos cerveaux cartésiens».

<sup>4</sup> O. Clément, *La rencontre de Jean Paul II et de Dimitrios I<sup>o</sup>*, in «Service orthodoxe de presse», 1979 n° 43, p.2: «A propos de la méthode théologique, Jean-Paul II a fait allusion aussi à ce que nous appellerions, nous orthodoxes, la méthode *apophatique* lorsqu'il dit que la théologie vise d'abord une attitude d'adoration, adoration d'un mystère indicible par rapport auquel nos formulations doivent revêtir une certaine humilité».

<sup>5</sup> П. Флоренский / P. Florenskij, *Столп и утверждение истины / La colonna e il fondamento della verità*, Москва 1917 / Bari 1974, стр. 156 / p. 207: «Noi di necessità spezzettiamo ogni cosa che vogliamo analizzare e distinguiamo l'analizzato in aspetti incompatibili. Considerando la stessa cosa da lati diversi, cioè agendo su diversi lati dell'attività spirituale, possiamo pervenire ad antinomie, a tesi incompatibili nel gli nostro raziocinio; solo nei momenti di grazia dell'illuminazione queste contraddizioni mentali sono eliminate, non in maniera razionale bensì transrazionale. L'antinomicità non dice affatto: “O questo o quello non è vero”; non dice nemmeno: “Né questo né quello è vero”; ma dice soltanto: “E questo e quello è vero, ma ciascuno a modo suo, mentre l'armonia e l'unità sono superiori alla ragione“. L'antinomicità proviene dal frazionamento dell'essere stesso, e il raziocinio fa parte dell'essere».

cueillir le passage de l'humain au divin, il faut rompre la linéarité de la logique mentale<sup>1</sup>. C'est pourquoi, l'accueil du « maximum » dans la conversion semble souvent, selon les paramètres humains, moins du minimum consciemment assimilé.

## L'ANTINOMIE DE LA NON CONFLICTUALITE ENTRE DIEU ET L'UNIVERS CREE

En mettant en avant la clé « rationnelle » ou celle du « mystère », l'intention de fond semble de toute façon prendre en considération la possibilité d'un rapport effectif entre le divin et l'humain. Mais, en focalisant tout sur le mystère, on ne perd – peut-être – pas de vue la consistance cohérente de l'univers humain même dans sa spécificité ? Misant tout sur la « divinisation » dans le mystère donné en plénitude, on ne retient pas la différence entre Dieu et l'humanité ? En enlevant, ensuite, la différence entre Dieu et la personne humaine, on abolirait – finalement – « l'humainement humain » même ! Mais, il est vrai que la déification ou la *theosis* est seulement ou reste strictement une notion « hellénistique », ou les traditions d'orient ont reproposeé une vision plus purement évangélique de cette intuition, qui sait, aussi en réponse à un approfondissement notable du sens religieux alors existant et auquel « l'orient chrétien » nécessairement réponde, recueillant en cela ce qu'il présentait de plus constructif et en réorientant ce qui pouvait y être d'ambigu. Les distinctions analytique pourraient se coaguler dans la « mère de toutes les distinction » : celle entre matière et esprit, entre Dieu et créature, ou c'est – à – dire dans un dualisme assez problématique<sup>2</sup>. La non linéarité du passage de l'exhaustivité humaine à la plénitude divine s'exprime comme « inconnaissabilité » de Dieu : la connaissance mentale serait comme une idole au contraire de la révélation divine<sup>3</sup>. On pourrait anticiper que le mystère de la filiation divine dans la Trinité est le mystère de la non conflictualité ultime entre Dieu et l'humanité. La filiation divine

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<sup>1</sup> P. Evdokimov, *La connaissance de Dieu selon la tradition orientale*, Paris 1970, pp. 10-11: «Celui qui dirait: Dieu est Créateur, Providence, Sauveur, passe les chapitres d'un manuel, ou témoigne d'une spéculation, d'une distance dialectique entre Dieu et lui. Dieu, dans ce n'est pas le Tout, passionnément et spontanément saisi, e une donnée immédiate de sa révélation. Un des plus sévères parmi les ascètes, saint Jean Climaque, disait qu'il faut aimer Dieu comme un fiancé aime sa fiancée Un amoureux, un passionné de son objet. dirait: "Mais c'est tout!... c'est ma vie!... il n'y a que cela!...tout le reste ne compte pas, est inexistant". Saint Grégoire de Nysse, au comble de son étonnement, laisse simplement échapper: "Toi qu'aime mon âme...". La tradition patristique renonce à toute définition formelle, car Dieu est au-delà de toute parole humaine: "Les concepts créent des idoles de Dieu, l'émerveillement seul saisit quelque chose", confesse saint Grégoire de Nysse. Le mot Dieu (\*), pour les Pères, est le vocatif qui s'adresse à l'Indicible. Mais le mystère du Créateur vient se refléter dans le miroir de la créature et fait dire à Théophile d'Antioche: "Montre-moi ton homme, et je te montrerai mon Dieu." Saint Pierre parle de l'homo cordis absconditus, l'homme caché du coeur (I P 3, 4). Le Deus absconditus, Dieu mystérieux, a créé son vis-à-vis: l'homo absconditus, l'homme mystérieux, son icône vivante. La vie spirituelle jaillit dans les "pâturages du coeur", dans ses espaces libres, dès que ces deux êtres mystérieux, Dieu et l'homme, s'y rencontrent. "Ce qui arrive de plus grand entre Dieu et l'homme, c'est d'aimer et d'être aimé", affirment les grands spirituels (\*\*).

(\*) St Grégoire de Naziance rattache Θεός à αἶθειν (brûler), Dieu est feu. Or. 30, 18. / (\*\*) Cfr S. Bulgakov, *Die Christliche Anthropologie*, in AA. VV., *Kirche, Staat und Mensch*, Genf 1937, S. 212.

<sup>2</sup> W. E. Wiest, *The Centenary of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America: an Appreciation*, in A. J. Philippou (Ed.), *The Orthodox Ethos*, Oxford 1964, p. 11: «There is a further comment which should be made, however, on this matter of the glory of God in creation. Professor Zernov suggests that western Christians have been inclined to make a 'sharper distinction between material and spiritual=. Under the influence of a sort of dualism, they have 'aspired towards a spirituality free from the imperfections and limitations of the physical world, and therefore [have striven] to liberate themselves from their dependence on matter in their worship. Orthodox, on the other hand, look upon matter as 'spirit-bearing'. (\*) Thus, as regards the presence of Christ in the celebration of the Eucharist, Roman Catholics have stressed the transformation of the elements into the body and blood of Christ at a given moment whereas Orthodox have thought of the whole process not so much as a momentary supernatural act of God but as the revealing of a Presence which is always there if we could but see. The elements are thought to change into Christ's body and blood, but there is also rather more stress on what might be called the 'natural' side of it, in that all physical 'elements' are seen as parts of God's creation. The material is meant to bear the stamp of divine glory, and this fact is an additional part of the meaning of what happens in the Eucharist. Western (especially Protestant) inability to appreciate the Orthodox attitude towards ikons is also often attributed to a Western tendency to depreciate matter.(\*\*).

(\*) Zernov, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 62-64. / (\*\*) Cf. Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-41. The criticism of the use of icons is not of course, based on an aversion to matter as such, but on a suspicion that something created and finite is receiving worship or veneration due only to God. Orthodox Christians certainly do not intend any such thing. It is true that most Protestants do not look upon the material universe as 'sacramental' in the same sense as the Orthodox although one could not say that such a view was lacking in Luther. A thorough discussion of the theological issues raised here would go beyond the scope of this essay.

<sup>3</sup> Cfr Gregorio di Nissa, *Sulla vita di Mosè*, in P. G., t. 44, col. 377; Vl. Lossky, *Vision de Dieu*, Neuchatel 1962, pp. 134-140.

inclut directement l'offrande de la divinisation de l'humain en Dieu <sup>1</sup>. La compénétration entre le divin et l'humain, apparemment impossible, ne se réalise pas moins en Christ. Cette « impossible possibilité » se présentera à l'esprit humain comme « antinomie »<sup>2</sup> : une impossibilité selon les paramètres de notre compréhension qui a lieu dans l'expérience et se révèle dans la foi. La manière d'opérer de notre intelligence semble, en effet, s'appuyer sur la tactique des oppositions pour pouvoir classer logiquement les dates de la connaissance. Dans l'antinomie de ce mystère on ne se trouve pas confronté à une opposition irréductible de deux domaines qui se présentent comme antithétiques et de laquelle surgit une conflictualité fondamentale. L'orient chrétien a compris cette promesse méthodologique et porte en avant ses références interreligieuses – toujours, il nous semble – à ce niveau pneumatologique. Dans cette approche nous trouvons la confirmation de la non-conformité entre progressivité humaine et don gratuit et surabondant de la vie divinisante. C'est la conséquence directe de « l'antinomie » du mystère de Dieu : l'humain ne correspond pas au divin, il n'y a pas une composition rationnelle entre le 'limité' humain et « l'incirconscribable » divin. Pour accueillir le passage de l'humain au divin, il faut briser la linéarité de la logique mentale (cfr ci-dessus). C'est pourquoi, l'accueil du 'maximum' dans la conversion semble souvent, selon les paramètres humains, moins du minimum consciemment assimilé (rationnellement articulé). La non linéarité du passage de l'exhaustivité humaine à la plénitude divine s'exprime comme 'inconnaisabilité' de Dieu : la connaissance mentale serait comme une idole au lieu de la révélation divine<sup>3</sup>. La même conversion à la foi évangélique est antinomique, comme nous l'avons à peine vu. L'antinomie nous fait sortir des paramètres de la cohérence humaine, il semble que crolle la substantielle compacité de l'intelligence de l'initiative pratique humaine. Ce renversement ne regarde pas principalement la situation de 'péché' mais concerne tous. Evidemment, tout cela ne correspond pas à la 'négation de

<sup>1</sup> P. I. Bratsiotis, *The fundamental Principles and main Characteristics of the Orthodox Church*, in A. J. Philippou, *The Orthodox Ethos*, Oxford 1964, p. 26: «As for content, the emphasis given to the incarnation of the Logos, and especially to the divinity of Christ, may be regarded as a fundamental principle of Orthodoxy, to which is correlated the deification (theosis) of man. Another important feature of our Church. This correlation has been common in the Orthodox Church since the time of St. Athanasius and owes much to his influence. This explains, I think, why Easter, the pasche of the Lord, 'the feast of feasts and the festival of festivals', through which 'Christ our God has raised us from death to life and from earth to heaven', and 'has clothed our mortal nature with incorruptible dignity through his passion', is the greatest and most brilliant festival of the Orthodox Church».

<sup>2</sup> S. Bulgakov, *Die Christliche Anthropologie*, in AA. VV., *Kirche, Staat und Mensch*, Genf 1937, S. 211-212: «Die antinomische Thesis unterscheidet sich dadurch von der dialektischen, daß der dialektischen Gegensatz der Thesis und Antinomie in der Synthesis aufgehoben wird... Der Gedanke hat alle seine Möglichkeiten erschöpft und macht angesichts der Unmöglichkeit jedes Weiterkommen Halt». П. Флоренский / P. Florenskij, *Столп и утверждение истины / La colonna e il fondamento della verità*, Москва 1917 / Bari 1974, стр. 159-160 / p. 207: «Noi di necessità spezzettiamo ogni cosa che vogliamo analizzare e distinguiamo l'analizzato in aspetti incompatibili. Considerando la stessa cosa da lati diversi, cioè agendo su diversi lati dell'attività spirituale, possiamo pervenire ad antinomie, a tesi incompatibili nel nostro raziocinio; solo nei momenti di grazia dell'illuminazione queste contraddizioni mentali sono eliminate, non in maniera razionale bensì transrazionale. L'antinomicità non dice affatto: "O questo o quello non è vero"; non dice nemmeno: "Né questo né quello è vero"; ma dice soltanto: "E questo e quello è vero, ma ciascuno a modo suo, mentre l'armonia e l'unità sono superiori al le la ragione". L'antinomicità proviene dal frazionamento dell'essere stesso, e il raziocinio fa parte dell'essere».

<sup>3</sup> Gregorio di Nissa, *Sulla vita di Mosè*, in P. G., t. 44, col. 377; VI. Lossky, *Vision de Dieu*, Neuchatel 1962, pp. 134-140; idem, *Théologie mystique de l'Eglise d'orient*, Paris 1944, pp. 31-32: "C'est le fond apophatique de toute vraie théologie que les " grands Cappadociens " défendaient dans leur discussion avec Eunomius. Ce dernier soutenait la possibilité d'exprimer l'essence divine dans des concepts innés par lesquels elle se révèle à la raison. Pour saint Basile non seulement l'essence divine, mais les essences créées ne sauraient non plus être exprimées par des concepts. En contemplant les objets nous analysons leurs propriétés, ce qui nous permet de former les concepts. Toutefois, cette analyse ne pourra jamais épuiser le contenu des objets de notre perception, il restera toujours un "résidu irrationnel" qui lui échappera, qui ne saura être exprimé dans les concepts c'est le fond inconnaisable des choses, ce qui constitue leur vraie essence indéfinissable. En ce qui concerne les noms que nous appliquons à Dieu, ils nous révèlent ses énergies qui descendent vers nous, mais ne nous rapprochent pas de son essence inaccessible (1). Pour saint Grégoire de Nysse tout concept relatif à Dieu est un simulacre, une image fallacieuse, une idole. Les concepts que nous formons selon l'entendement et l'opinion qui nous sont naturels, en nous basant sur une représentation intelligible, créent des idoles de Dieu, au lieu de nous révéler Dieu lui-même (2). Il n'y a qu'un seul nom pour exprimer la nature divine c'est l'étonnement qui saisit l'âme quand elle pense à Dieu (3). Saint Grégoire de Nazianze, en citant Platon sans le nommer ("l'un des théologiens hellènes"), corrige de la manière suivante le passage du *Timée* sur la difficulté de connaître Dieu et l'impossibilité de l'exprimer: et il est impossible d'exprimer la nature de Dieu, mais il est encore moins possible de la connaître" (4). Ce remaniement de la sentence de Platon par un auteur chrétien qui est souvent considéré comme un platonisant montre à lui seul combien la pensée des Pères est loin de celle des philosophes».

(1) *Adversus Eunomium*, I, 1, e. 6, P. G., t. 29, Coll. 521-4; I, II, c. 4, Coll. 577-580; I, II, c. 32, Col. 648; *Ad Amphiloctum, Epist. 234*, P. G., t. 32, col. 869 AC. Cf. GREG. DE NYSSE, *C. Eunom.*, X, P. G., t. 45, COI. 828. / (2) *De vita Moysis*, P. G., t. 44, col. 377 B (trad. DANIELOU, P. 122; *Contra Eunomium*, III, P. G., t. 45, col. 604 B-D; XII, *ibid.*, col. 944 C. / (3) *In Cantica Cantorum*, homil. XII, P. G., t. 44, col. 1028 D. / (4) *Oratio XXVII (theologica II)*, 4, P. G., t. 36, coll. 29-32.

l'absurde', qui parfois vient à être mentionné comme raison pour croire : *'credo quia absurdum'*, de la veine ouverte par Tertullien et les autres après lui<sup>1</sup>. Voici qu'on mentionne une possible racine d'ambiguïté 'rationnelle' de la même théologie négative d'occident.

## **ANTINOMIE ORIENTALE ET PARADOXE DE LA REFORME**

Dans le paradoxe réformé d'occident l'incompatibilité se trouve au delà de la configuration humaine en tant que telle: tout se joue sur l'extranéité du péché dans l'expérience de la foi. Pour nous la connaissance de Dieu demeure paradoxale, parce que c'est la connaissance de l'unique existence comme personne d'amour dans sa grâce face à notre perte, sans possibilité de comparaison ou de référence pour stabiliser notre approche à lui. Il n'existe aucune alternative, même dialectique, qui puisse indiquer ou circonscrire Dieu dans un mode donné ou dans un contexte donné duquel il deviendrait tributaire<sup>2</sup>. On considère paradoxalement la personne humaine 'et' pécheresse 'et' justifiée (« simul...et »).

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<sup>1</sup> D. B. Clendenin, *The Western Enthronement and Eastern Distrust of Rationalism* (This is excerpted from *Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Western Perspective* from Baker Books, Grand Rapids, MI.), in «Internet» 1996, <http://www.ocf.org/TheChristianActivist/AProtestantExamines.html>: «Eastern thinkers, by contrast, begin their thinking about God with a very different mind-set. As the examples of my students Vasily and Maxim show, Eastern thinkers typically exhibit a skepticism toward Western rationalism; some have even suggested that such distrust of rationalism is endemic to Orthodoxy. Conversely, Orthodoxy fosters a positive appreciation for mystery.[1] Any number of Orthodox thinkers could be cited to verify this characterization. An anti-Western posture is particularly strong in the so called Slavophile movement. Thinkers like Alexei Khomiakov (1804-60) and Lev Shestov (1866-1938) were sharply critical of Peter the Great's Westernizing program and the concomitant influence of rationalism in particular. Shestov's rejection of rationalism was one of the most uncompromising and categorical to appear in Russian thought. He insisted that Kant's demand that theology justify itself before the bar of reason would inevitably lead to an "autocracy of reason"; reason would be the master, placing the cause of religion "in a bad way." [2] In Shestov's thought, biblical faith and philosophic reliance on logic were two very different and incompatible vantage points. Khomiakov, the chief advocate of the Slavophile movement, sees Protestantism and Catholicism as two versions of the same incipient rationalism; both are completely incompatible with Eastern Orthodoxy. In Khomiakov's thought, these two Western expressions of Christianity are rooted in the soil of rationalism and do not even deserve the appellation of faith. Orthodoxy "stands on completely different soil" and must be vigilant lest the "ruinous legacy" of Western rationalism, which contains "the embryo of death," kill the spiritual life of Eastern Christianity. Rooted in this fundamentally different perspective regarding reason and faith, Khomiakov insists that "the difference [between East and West] is so great that it is hardly possible to find one point on which they might agree." [3] It is important to note, however, that Eastern thinkers do not reject reason as a necessary component of human knowledge and experience. A reading of the Philokalia, the most important collection of Orthodox religious texts, will show the central role of the intellect in Eastern spirituality. Orthodoxy does not embrace a crass irrationalism that believes something because it is absurd (*credo quia absurdum est*). It was, after all, the Latin father Tertullian (c. 160-215) who made this extremist posture famous when he wrote that he believed in the death and resurrection of Christ precisely because they were absurd and impossible, [4] and that the worlds of Athens and Jerusalem, the philosophic academy and the Christian church, had nothing whatsoever in common. [5] Further, not all Eastern thinkers are as dogmatic as Shestov and Khomiakov, just as the four examples of Western theologians given above do not represent all theologians of the West. John Wesley, for example, has been shown to have a number of affinities with Eastern Orthodox thought. [6] While Eastern thinkers do not reject reason, they do reject what they see as the hubris of reason that now typifies Western culture. They resist any tendency that would allow or encourage reason to expunge theological mystery and appoint itself as the only criterion of truth. Ivan Kireevsky (180-56) is a case in point. Kireevsky, who according to Ugolnik coined the term secular humanism, laments the narrowness of analytic abstractions so common in the West, but he is careful not to fall into a triumphalist condemnation of reason per se. Instead, Kireevsky wants to moderate the Western impulse that views reason as the only mediator of truth: "If [Western rationalism] would only recognize its own limitations, and see that, in itself, it is only one of the instruments by means of which truth is known, and not the sole way to knowledge, then it would also view its conclusions as only conditional and relative to its point of view, and would expect other, supreme and most truthful conclusions from another supreme and most truthful mode of thinking." [7].

1. Frederick C. Copleston, *Philosophy in Russia* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 16; Sergius Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church*, rev. ed. (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1988), chap. 11, "Orthodox Mysticism." / 2. Lev Shestov, *Speculation and Revelation*, trans. Bernard Martin (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1982), 41, 21. On Shestov see Frederick C. Copleston, *Russian Religious Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), chap. 6. / 3. Alexei S. Khomiakov, "On the Western Confessions of Faith," in Alexander Schmemmann, ed., *Ultimate Questions: An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1977), 29-69. / 4. Tertullian "On the Flesh of Christ," in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, 10 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1950), 3:525. / 5. Tertullian "Prescription against Heretics," in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, 3:246. / 6. Randy Maddox, "John Wesley and Eastern Orthodoxy: Influences, Convergences, and Differences," *Asbury Theological Journal* 45.2 (Fall 1990): 29-53; and Howard Snyder, "John Wesley and Macarius of Egypt," *Asbury Theological Journal* 45.2 (Fall 1990): 55-60. / 7. Ivan Kireevsky, "Of the Necessity and Possibility of New Principles for Philosophy," in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Theological Academy, 1861), 318 (cited by Ugolnik, *Illuminating Icon*, 193). Cf. Vladimir Weidle, "Russia and the West," in Schmemmann, *Ultimate Questions*, 11-27, who argues that the differences between Russia and the West have been exaggerated and that Europe as well as Byzantium has deeply influenced Russia.

<sup>2</sup> K. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, II, 1, Zürich 1975, S. 322-323: «Es ist das Paradoxon des Zusammenseins seiner Gnade mit unserer Verlorenheit, nicht das Paradoxon des Zusammenseins von zwei für uns logisch unvereinbaren Begriffen. Gerade in Anerkennung des wirklichen, des göttlichen Paradoxons werden wir Gottes Personsein und Gottes Absolutheit nicht nebeneinander stehen und nicht nebeneinander stellen in der Weise, wie wir es zur Beschreibung geschöpflicher Wirklichkeiten mit und ohne logische Widersprüche allerdings oft genug tun müssen, sondern werden wir uns daran halten, dass Gott sich uns als der, der er ist, nämlich als der Liebende und also als der Eine, als die Person offenbart hat und dass wir daneben nichts Anderes (sei es nun mit jenem logisch vereinbar oder unvereinbar), sondern in aller Aufmerksamkeit auf dessen einzigartige Eigenart Dieses und nur Dieses, mit allen Konsequenzen dieses Eine zu sagen haben: dieses Eine (dass er der Eine ist!) so, dass es dem entspricht, was er selber uns in seinem Wort darüber vorgesagt hat, wobei

## L'expérience réformée dans le paradoxe et la raison face à la foi aujourd'hui

L'intention œcuménique, partant de la commune priorité du mystère, découvre aussi la contribution de la Réforme d'occident en ce qui concerne la foi. Elle parlera de 'paradoxe' de la justification où tout se joue sur la sortie de l'extranéité du péché dans l'expérience de la foi. De la chute originelle ressurgit le rapport paradoxal entre 'liberté' et 'finitude'<sup>1</sup>. Comme pour l'antinomie de l'orient chrétien mais avec une focalisation propre de l'expérience occidentale concernant la priorité du péché dans la mésaventure humaine, le 'paradoxe' représente une voie méthodologique pour exprimer le mystère de Dieu<sup>2</sup>. Il s'agit de 'penser ce qui ne être pensé'<sup>3</sup>. C'est justement du paradoxe que la voie vers la vérité ne se parcourt pas comme une réflexion abstraite (conceptuelle...) mais de la même dynamique du 'dialogue' entre sujets en chemin<sup>4</sup>. Pour nous la connaissance de Dieu demeure paradoxale, parce que celle-ci est la connaissance de l'unique existant comme personne d'amour dans sa grâce face à notre perte, sans possibilité de comparaison ou de référence entre Lui et nous pour établir notre approche de foi. Il n'existe aucune alternative mentale, ni dialectique, qui puisse indiquer ou

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dann gewiss auch das, was mit 'dem Absoluten' gemeint sein könnte, zu Ehren kommen wird, aber gerade nicht so, als ob dies, dass er der Eine ist, da durch, dass er 'absolut' ist, als dialektisch begrenzt und ergänzt erscheinen würde, als müssten wir nun doch, um Gott zu bezeichnen, über seine Persönlichkeit und über seine Absolutheit hinaus in irgend einen leeren Raum weisen, als ob Gott erst dort, in der dialektischen Überwindung dieses Gegensatzes, wahrhaft und wirklich Gott wäre».

<sup>1</sup> P. Foreman, *The Neo-Orthodox Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr*, in «Internet» 2004, <http://www.leaderu.com/isot/docs/niehbr3.html>: «Niebuhr's theology was not something thought up in the quiet of an academic environment. Rather, it grew out of his efforts to apply Christianity to the social, economic, and political spheres (Hordern, 151). For example, the cross of Christ was a particularly important theme for Niebuhr since it revealed the great paradox of powerlessness turned into power, of a love in justice that overcame the sinful world. (Elwell, 777)... The Fall conveys the fact that persons stand in the paradoxical relation of freedom and finitude. As spirit, persons transcend nature and so are free. But as creatures, they are part of nature's order and so are bound. For this Niebuhr depended heavily on Soren Kierkegaard's Concept of Dread (Erickson, 587). As those both free and bound, persons inevitably experience anxiety- the internal precondition for sin. In this state of anxiety Satan tempts persons to deny their limitations through pride or to violate their freedom through sensuality (Lewis, 189)... Niebuhr, like Barth and Brunner, denied that original sin transmits to the race by generation. He said, "Original sin is not an inherited corruption, but it is an inevitable fact of human existence. . It is there in every moment of existence, but it has no history" (Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, 86) This is the paradox of the Christian faith, the fact that each person inevitably sins and yet bears personal responsibility for his sins (Lewis, 190). Sin does not result from the imperfections of society; it causes them (Hordern, 165)».

<sup>2</sup> R. V. Schnucker, *Neo-Orthodoxy – History*, in AA. VV., *Elwell Evangelical Dictionary*, in «Internet» 2004, <http://mb-soft.com/believe/txc/neoortho.htm>: «The methodological approach of the movement involved dialectical theology, theology of paradox, and crisis theology. The use of dialectical thinking goes back to the Greek world and Socrates' use of questions and answers to derive insight and truth. It was used by Abelard in Sic et Non, and is the technique of posing opposites against each other in the search for truth. Barth and the early leaders were probably attracted to the dialectic as the result of their study of Soren Kierkegaard's writing. For Kierkegaard, propositional truths are not sufficient; assent to a series of religious formulations or creeds is not enough. Kierkegaard believed theological assertions of the faith to be paradoxical. This requires the believer to hold opposite "truths" in tension. Their reconciliation comes in an existential act generated after anxiety, tension, and crisis, and which the mind takes to be a leap of faith. The neo - orthodox took the position that traditional and liberal Protestantism had lost the insight and truth of the faith. The nineteenth century theologians had taken the paradoxes of faith, dissolved their tension, used rational, logical, coherent explanations as a substitute, creating propositions, and thus had destroyed the living dynamic of the faith. For the neo - orthodox, paradoxes of the faith must remain precisely that, and the dialectic method which seeks to find the truth in the opposites of the paradoxes leads to a true dynamic faith. As an example of this consider the statement: "In the No found in God's righteous anger one finds the Yes of his compassion and mercy." Some of the paradoxes identified by the neo-orthodox movement are the absolute transcendence of God in contrast with the self - disclosure of God; Christ as the God - man; faith as a gift and yet an act; humans as sinful yet free; eternity entering time. How is it possible to have a wholly other God who reveals himself? How is it possible for the man Jesus of history to be the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity? How can one speak of faith as God's gift and yet involve human action? How is it possible for humans to be simultaneously sinful and saved? How is it possible for eternity, which is apart from time, to break in on time? In struggling with these, the temptation is to rationalize answers and avoid the crisis of faith; but the neo - orthodox eschewed such a solution. It is only in crisis / struggling that one can rise above the paradox and be grasped by the truth in such a way as to defy rational explanation. Crisis is that point where yes and no meet. It is that theological point where the human recognizes God's condemnation of all human endeavours in morals, religion, thought processes, scientific discoveries, and so on, and the only release is from God's word. The neo - orthodox, in summarizing their methodology, used dialectics in relation to the paradoxes of the faith which precipitated crises which in turn became the situation for the revelation of truth».

<sup>3</sup> J. Marsden, *Review of the Paradoxical Vision: A Public Theology for the Twenty-first Century*. By Robert Benne, in «Internet» 2004, <http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9506/reviews/marsden.html>: «Tinder, while less well known outside academic circles than Niebuhr or Neuhaus, may be the purest representative of the paradoxical vision. His much celebrated textbook, *Political Thinking*, is prefaced with this statement from Soren Kierkegaard: "The paradox is the source of the thinker's passion, and the thinker without a paradox is like a lover without feeling: a paltry mediocrity. The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think"».

<sup>4</sup> J. Art, *Eva Kushner. The Living Prism: Itineraries in Comparative Literature*, in «University of Toronto Quarterly», Volume 72, Number 1, Winter 2002/3; etiam in «Internet» 2004, [http://www.utpjournals.com/product/utq/721/721\\_review\\_art.html](http://www.utpjournals.com/product/utq/721/721_review_art.html): «Dialogue and paradox are significant in the emergence of self and selves in this period. Part of these apt 'meanderings of the search for truth,' the world of Renaissance dialogue, may be a paradox of subjectivity - for which Kushner holds up Erasmus as a model».

circonscire Dio in un modo dato o in un contesto dato in cui si possa concettualmente l'indicare. Il mistero di Dio è « paradosso assoluto »<sup>1</sup>. L'incarnazione di Gesù è « l'insolubile paradosso »<sup>2</sup>.

La via della riforma è stata genialmente riaffermata dai suoi più significativi portavoce, tra i quali il recente K. Barth assiduo osservatore del concilio Vaticano II e legato d'amicizia al Papa Paolo VI. Per la buona parte del XX° secolo, il rappresentò l'autorità dottrinale più solida della riscoperta della Riforma. Per l'ispiratore del viraggio teologico del XX° secolo, si parla della sua intenzione apofatista e dell'uso dell'antinomia, del debutto stesso del suo itinerario teologico<sup>3</sup>. Per il giovane Barth, seguendo Lutero, la « ragione » aristotelica è ormai fuori del contesto della fede e limitato da Kant all'affare umano appare come « fabbrica di falsi dèi »<sup>4</sup>. Si può veramente mettere d'equo a equo la « ragione » e « l'esperienza » come due elementi puramente umani (con un Occidente cattolico basato sulla « ragione » e una Riforma basata su « l'esperienza ») ? Alcuni sembrano mettere Barth in denunciante di fronte a queste due deviazioni<sup>5</sup>. D'altri hanno sottolineato l'impossibilità di entrare nella prospettiva barthiana senza il presupposto della incontro con Dio in « l'esperienza » della fede<sup>6</sup>. Evidentemente, « l'esperienza » della fede, priorità dell'intenzione originale come

<sup>1</sup> J. A. Fowler *Making the irrational rational*, in «Internet» 2004, <http://www.christinyou.net/pages/irrational.html>: «Christians have long pondered how to explain the gospel in a logical way. The nineteenth century Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, simply admitted that all religion, including the Christian religion, was illogical. In his *Journals* (1848), he wrote, "The problem is not to understand Christianity, but to understand that it cannot be understood." To assert that Eternal Being could and would take physical shape in time, and allow itself to die a terrible death, was the "absolute paradox" according to Kierkegaard. That one could be infinite and finite, eternal and temporal, God and man at the same time, could only be impossible, illogical and absurd – an "offense" to human understanding. What Kierkegaard called the "absolute paradox" results when reason collides with itself in logical contradictions. But according to Kierkegaard, this did not necessarily result in non-sense. Human reason must accept its limitations, the objective and empirical parameters of its capability, and allow the illogic of paradox to remain. When reason collides with something foreign, something outside of its realm of understanding, it must, to remain true to the scientific objective of seeking to know and perceive, admit and accept consideration of that which transcends its comprehension. The supernatural "other" which reason collides with is revelation – the Self-revelation of a transcendent God who created human reasoning, transcends human reasoning, and surprises human logic with the revealing of Himself within the natural context. Reasoned Christian faith must, therefore, embrace the paradox of logical contradiction and the tension of dialectic, recognizing that Christianity will always be illogical and absurd when considered only at the level of natural, human logic. Human reasoning will always be insufficient for becoming or being a Christian, for it cannot comprehend what faith perceives and receives».

<sup>2</sup> J. A. Fowler *Making the irrational rational*, in «Internet» 2004, <http://www.christinyou.net/pages/irrational.html>: «The union of deity and humanity in the person of Jesus Christ, the God-man, is unlike any other union. The singularity of the Christic union is such that all attempts to make analogous comparisons will always result in inadequate conceptions and explanations, as is also true with the distinction and union dialectic of the Trinity. Christians must accept the irresolvable logical paradox, while simultaneously affirming the Theo-logic of the hypostatic union of the God-man, Jesus Christ. The singular historic person of Jesus was "truly God" and "truly man"».

<sup>3</sup> P. Brazier, *Barth's First Commentary on Romans (1919): An Exercise in Apophatic Theology?* in «International Journal of Systematic Theology», Volume 6, Issue 4, Page 387, October 2004, etiam in «Internet» 2004, <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2400.2004.00143>: «Abstract: Barth's first commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans is paradigmatic of his use of apophatic language and theology in the development away from the liberal neo-Protestant theology of his teachers. This negation is for a purpose – the assertion of the truths of the human condition and God's solution in Christ that were posited by the apostle Paul. Methodologically this is a supplementary apophatic—cataphatic dialectic (within which is a further dialectic: *Diesseits—Jenseits*), comparable with the way eternity reaches into and transforms the fallen and broken human world. The evidence for negation in *Römerbrief*<sup>6</sup> is examined, showing how Barth seeks to refute the domestication of God in the self-satisfaction of our language, allowing for biblical-Christian truth to stand».

<sup>4</sup> H. Urs von Balthasar, *Glaubhaft ist nur Liebe*, Einsiedeln 1963, S. 21: «Hier kreuzen sich alle Straßen der Neuzeit. Zuerst liegt hier der Übergang von Luther zu Karl Barth, insofern Luther die (aristotelische) Vernunft abgesetzt hatte, um dem Glauben Platz zu machen: diese Vernunft hat unterdessen kartesische Gestalt angenommen, sie ist zur wissenschaftlich-weltkonstruktiven Vernunft geworden: diese prometheische Funktion wird bei Kant kritisch beschränkt zu einer verfügbaren Funktion des Menschen, die insofern nichts mit Religion zu tun hat, und deshalb beim jungen Karl Barth zur Götzenfabrik und insofern zum Gegensatz echten Glaubens werden wird».

<sup>5</sup> A. Milano, *Rivelazione ed ermeneutica. Karl Barth. Rudolf Bultmann. Italo Mancini*, Urbino 1988, p. 14: «Una dottrina che non si comprende più viene ridotta a massime razionali e sentimentali. Ma ragione e sentimento sono del tutto estranee alla rivelazione. Alla fine Schleiermacher e la teologia liberale, che a lui si richiama, concludono, secondo Barth, il malefico stravolgimento della teologia in antropologia, in quanto pervertono la rivelazione in religione, la fede in esperienza religiosa. Ecco allora perché Barth, compiendo una virata di 180 gradi, una vera e propria rivoluzione copernicana, si impegna, per così dire, a ri-teologizzare la teologia proprio elaborando un nuovo concetto di rivelazione contrapposto a quello di religione, e di fede contrapposto a quello di esperienza religiosa».

<sup>6</sup> L. Malcolm, *Theological Freedom and the Therapy of Faith: Thinking with and beyond Karl Barth and Karl Rahner*, in Internet 1999, [http://home.apu.edu/~CTRF/papers/1996\\_papers/malcolm.html](http://home.apu.edu/~CTRF/papers/1996_papers/malcolm.html): Thus, Barth's concept of 'divine command' cannot be divorced from the believer's actual encounter with God as that encounter is experienced in the paradigmatic practice of piety of the Reformed tradition—the practice of hearing and doing the preached Word. In his doctrine of the knowledge of God, Barth establishes this connection between piety and theological reflection, appropriating classical Calvinist and Lutheran understandings of the hidden and revealed God. In his view, the concept of divine hiddenness does not refer to a limit in the human capacity to know God but rather is primarily a statement about God: that God is the one who first apprehends and possesses us in our knowledge of God. Given both our creatureliness and sinfulness, we cannot "know" God as an "object" of knowledge as "knowing subjects" would "master" in our "apprehension" of it, or "become one with" it in our "possession" of it. Rather, what Barth wants to stress is that our capacity to view and conceive God is contingent on divine will. Indeed, God

celle de la Réforme d'occident, n'a rien à voir avec cette comparaison (voir les œuvres sur la Réforme et sur l'orient chrétien). 'L'incompréhensibilité de Dieu' signifie sa liberté<sup>1</sup>, non le fait qu'il ne puisse être objet de notre compréhension conceptuelle<sup>2</sup>. Il ne sert à rien de substituer l'incompréhensibilité de Dieu avec quelque espèce de 'sublimité' de type moraliste ou humaniste<sup>3</sup>, ou d'éternité comme linéarité infinie du temps<sup>4</sup>. L'infinie indique, dans son expressivité négative, l'antinomie impliquée dans les mêmes potentialités du fini, mais ne constitue pas une affirmation de transcendance<sup>5</sup>. L'approche métaphysique (ou mathématique) sur la distinction entre 'fini' et 'infini' n'aident pas à entrer dans la perspective existentielle de « l'être » même de Dieu<sup>6</sup>. Avec ce rappel à la consistance 'existentielle' nous nous retrouvons ultérieurement conduits à cueillir la coupe typique de la continue recherche d'une relation concrète formulée comme 'critère de réalisme'<sup>7</sup>. La transcendance de l'inconditionnel pourrait être une tromperie sans cette priorité 'réaliste'. Cette concrétude est

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"permits" and "commands" us to adopt pictures, thoughts, and words to view, think, and speak about God, but there is an inner limit to our apprehension and possession of God in these forms. God always remains "hidden" precisely in the revelation of Jesus Christ, and it is only because God wills to reveal the divine self in this way that we are authorized and commanded to view and conceive God. Hence, our knowledge of God is always a knowledge by "faith" not "sight"; it is always "indirect," not "direct." The certainty of this knowledge resides only in God's being known by God. Human beings only participate in God's own self-knowledge secondarily, by analogy. Thus, in ourselves, our certainty about the knowledge of God is always "indirect," "relative," and "uncertain," even though God's own self-knowledge, which occurs outside of us, is always "direct," "absolute," and "certain." In sum, this understanding of the hidden and revealed God is pivotal in Barth's concept of theological method and it cannot be divorced from the actual paradigmatic faith experience of hearing and doing the preached Word in the Reformed tradition.

<sup>1</sup> K. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, B. I, 1. Zürich 1975, S. 39f: «In dieser seiner Freiheit gründet die Unterscheidung des Wesens Gottes als solches von seinem Wesen als des Wirkenden, als des Sichoffenbarenden. In dieser Freiheit gründet die Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes, die Unangemessenheit aller Erkenntnis des offenbaren Gottes. Auch die Dreieinigkeit Gottes ist uns nur in Gottes Wirken offenbar. Darum ist uns auch die Dreieinigkeit Gottes unbegreiflich. Daher auch die Unangemessenheit aller unserer Erkenntnis der Dreieinigkeit. Die Begreiflichkeit, in der sie sich uns primär in der Schrift, sekundär in der kirchlichen Trinitätslehre dargestellt hat, ist eine kreatürliche Begreiflichkeit. Sie ist von der Begreiflichkeit, in der Gott für sich selber existiert, nicht nur relativ, sondern absolut geschieden. Nur auf der freien Gnade der Offenbarung beruht es, daß jene Begreiflichkeit in dieser absoluten Geschiedenheit von ihrem Gegenstand dennoch nicht ohne Wahrheit ist».

<sup>2</sup> K. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, B. II, 1, Zürich 1975, S. 208: «Versuchen wir es zunächst, uns über den Inhalt des Satzes von Gottes Verborgenheit näher zu verständigen. Wir haben zunächst sprachlich festzustellen: es geht nicht nur um seine Unbegreiflichkeit nicht nur darum, daß Gott nicht begriffen d. h. nicht Inhalt eines von uns gebildeten Begreifens als solches gedacht ist. Es geht allerdings auch darum. Wir können Gott nicht begreifen, weil und indem wir ihn schon nicht anschauen können, weil er nicht Gegenstand eines unserer Wahrnehmungsbilder werden kann, auf die sich dann unsere Begriffe, unsere Denkbilder und zuletzt unsere Worte und Sätze beziehen».

<sup>3</sup> P. Tillich, *The Shaking of the Foundations*, Harmondworth 1964, p. 95: «Humanism has transformed the inaccessibility of God into the sublimity of His moral commands. Humanism has forgotten that God's majesty, as experienced by the prophet, implies the shaking of the foundations wherever He appears, and the veil of smoke whenever He shows Himself. When God is identified with an element in human nature, as in humanism, the terrifying and annihilating encounter with majesty becomes an impossibility».

<sup>4</sup> E. Brunner, *Das Ewige als Zukunft und Gegenwart*, Hamburg 1965, S. 59: «Von Ewigkeit reden, heißt von Gott reden. Ewigkeit hat allein Gott, der Herr der Zeit, der Herr der Welt. Ewigkeit ist darum nicht wie in der indisch-griechischen Ontologie oder in der platonischen Ideenlehre Zeitlosigkeit, Negation der Zeit. Der biblische Ewigkeitsgedanke ist streng dem biblischen Allmachtsgedanken parallel: Gottes Herrschaft über die Zeit. Die biblische Sprache kann leicht irreführen. Die Ewigkeit Gottes wird biblisch auf zwei verschiedene Weisen, von denen jede für sich genommen die andere aufhebt, ausgedrückt, nämlich Ewigkeit 'unendlich lange Zeit und Ewigkeit 'Negation der Zeit. Wäre die Ewigkeit bloß unendlich lange Zeit, so wäre Gott nicht Herr der Zeit. so hätte auch er Teil an der Vergänglichkeit, die zum Wesen der Zeitfolge, der "linearen" Zeit gehört».

<sup>5</sup> P. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. I, London 1968, pp. 211-212: «According to this analysis, infinity is related to finitude in a different way from that in which the other polar elements are related to one another. As the negative character of the word indicates, it is defined by the dynamic and free self-transcendence of finite being. Infinity is a directing concept, not a constituting concept. It directs the mind to experience its own unlimited potentialities, but it does not establish the existence of an infinite being. On this basis it is possible to understand the classical antinomies regarding the finite and the infinite character of the world. Even a physical doctrine of the finitude of space cannot keep the mind from asking what lies behind finite space».

<sup>6</sup> J. Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology*, London 1966, p. 188: «These remarks about immensity indicate how we must understand the most typical word in this group of attributes - "infinite". To take some abstract notion of infinity from metaphysics or mathematics and to apply it to God seems to me a thoroughly mistaken procedure; though to say this is not to deny that such notions might have some illustrative or interpretative value as analogues. But their defect is that they miss the existential dimension of the word "infinite" as applied to God, and it is this dimension that is basic. The word "infinite" when spoken of God, points to the contrast between our particular beings as "beings-there" (Dasein) and Being itself as that which makes any being-there possible. Arguments as to whether God is finite or infinite in a metaphysical sense, and whether one can find a clear metaphysical sense for the word "infinite" are matters which the theologian can leave aside».

<sup>7</sup> P. Tillich, *Auf der Grenze*, Hamburg 1962, S. 87: «Das Unbedingte könnte eine Täuschung sein, wenn es nicht erschiene durch die unbedingte Forderung des anderen, ihn als Person anzuerkennen. Und umgekehrt, der andere, wenn er nicht eine unbedingte Anerkennung seiner persönlichen Würde forderte, könnte als Mittel für meine Zwecke getauscht werden. Als Folge davon würde er seine Macht des Widerstandes und seine letzte Wirklichkeit verlieren. Die Einheit des Persönlichen und des Unbedingten oder des Ethischen und des Religiösen ist die Manifestation des wahrhaft Wirklichen denn sie widersteht ganz und gar jedem Versuch, in Subjektivität aufgelöst zu werden. Daraus ergibt sich ein viertes Prinzip der protestantischen Gestaltung: In jeder protestantischen Gestalt muß die Haltung des gläubigen Realismus zum Ausdruck kommen».

antécédent à n'importe quelle 'intuition'. On parlera de 'conscience immédiate' <sup>1</sup>. Il faut trouver le terme en même temps plus 'neutre' et plus direct dans l'expérience intérieure. Il s'agit d'enraciner la référence au mystère de Dieu dans une ontologie, l'unique capable de ne pas résulter autodestructive pour la formulation cosmologique de la source religieuse dans la réflexion humaine <sup>2</sup>. La transcendance devra être située à l'intérieure de la dynamique humaine : un 'beyond' qui anime la personne humaine elle-même <sup>3</sup>. Dieu est – donc – l'inconditionné, mais l'inconditionné n'est pas tout Dieu, le transcendant et inconditionné signifie 'être pris' par ce en quoi tous participent <sup>4</sup>. En cela il y a une 'rupture absolue' entre l'inconditionné et l'ensemble du monde des êtres, fracture entre l'infinité de Dieu et notre propre limite <sup>5</sup>. L'ouverture vers la transcendance se réalisera comme 'relation' avec le 'vous', être 'pour' l'autre et pour les autres, don de soi pour les autres dans le profil de celui qui a été crucifié, fracture de et dans la vie vécue <sup>6</sup>. Cette concrétude fait qu'on ne peut pas parler de Dieu en termes génériques : sa transparence est absolue liberté face à laquelle il n'y a plus autre façon que de 'faire place' à lui <sup>7</sup>. La Réforme converge – ici – avec l'intuition orientale dans la même intention de la 'prière du cœur' ou c'est – à – dire 'se vider pour faire place à la présence divinisante de Dieu (cfr. Les allusions à ce thème dans les études sur la théologie orientale). La concrétude de la référence à Dieu s'évoquera comme 'histoire' en ce sens qu'elle n'est pas la sphère du 'fini' dans son autosuffisance mais le domaine de l'écroulement du 'fini' replié sur lui-même, dans une expression qui se manifeste à première vue négativement mais ultérieurement positivement dans la réconciliation de la transcendance même <sup>8</sup>. L'histoire ne se limite pas, donc, à la seule 'immanence'. Mais ce sera la

<sup>1</sup> P. Tillich, *Theology of Culture*, Oxford 1968, pp. 22-23: «The ontological principle in the philosophy of religion may be stated in the following way: Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, theoretically as well as pactly. Awareness in this proposition, is used as the most neutral term. avoiding the connotations of the terms intuition, experience, knowledge. Awareness of the Unconditioned has not the character of intuition, for the Unconditioned does not appear in this awareness as a Gestalt to be intuited, but as an element, a power, a demand. Thomas was right in denying that the vision of God is a human possibility, in so far as men in time and space are concerned».

<sup>2</sup> P. Tillich, *Theology of Culture*, Oxford 1968, p. 26: «History and analysis have shown that the cosmological approach to religion leads to the self-destruction of religion, excepts as it is based on the ontological approach. If this basis is given, the cosmological principle can be stated in the following way: The Unconditioned of which we have an immediate awareness, without inference, can be recognized in the cultural and natural universe».

<sup>3</sup> A. Ramsey, *God, Christ and the World*, London 1969, p. 28: «Transcendence, however, is not only a characteristic of God in his relation to the world as One other than the world as well as in the world and through the world. Transcendence is also a characteristic of man in his inherent being as man. It is through the recognition of transcendence in man that divine transcendence is more meaningfully presented. This theme has been impressively drawn out by Dr. Vogel in his book *The Next Christian Epoch*. Vogel draws out the nature of the transcendence which belongs to man as man. It is an ability to be 'beyond' which is the most distinguishing feature of man's existence in the world. and it is because of our power to be 'beyond' our immediate situation that we are able to know things objectively. Thus it is true to say that transcendence is the essence of our existence as persons in the world: "Personal power is transcending power - the constant going beyond the formal, the immediate, the past and the present. Our very presence in the world gives a type of meaning to the world, but that meaning is the beginning and not the end of our lives"».

<sup>4</sup> P. Tillich, *Theology of Culture*, Oxford 1968, pp. 24-25: «God is unconditioned. that makes him God, but the "unconditional" is not God. The word "God" is filled with the concrete symbols in which mankind has expressed its ultimate concern its being grasped by something unconditional. And this "something" is not just a thing, but the power of being in which every being participates».

<sup>5</sup> P. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. I, London 1968, p. 263: «As the power of being, God transcends every being and also the totality of being □ the world. Being-itself is beyond finitude and infinity; otherwise it would be conditioned by something other than itself, and the real power of being would lie beyond both it and that which conditioned it. Being-itself infinitely transcends every finite being. There is no proportion or gradation between the finite and the infinite. There is an absolute break, an infinite jump. On the other hand, everything finite participates in being-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it would not have the power of being. It would be swallowed by non-being, or it never would have emerged out of non-being. This double relation of all beings to being itself gives being-itself a double characteristic».

<sup>6</sup> J. A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God*, London 1963, p. 76: «Our relation to God not a religious relationship to a supreme Being, absolute in power and goodness which is a spurious conception of transcendence, but a new life for others, through participation in the Being of God. The transcendence consists not in tasks beyond our scope and power, but in the nearest Thou at hand. God in human form, not, as in other religions, in animal form -the monstrous, chaotic, remote and terrifying nor yet in abstract form "the absolute, metaphysical, infinite, etc." nor yet in the Greek divine-human of autonomous man, but man existing for others, and hence the Crucified, a life based on the transcendent».

<sup>7</sup> D. Bonhoeffer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, B. III, München 1966, S. 103-104: «God as the absolutely free personality is therefore absolutely transcendent. Consequently I can not talk about him in general terms; he is always free and beyond these terms. The only task of my theological thinking must be to make room for the transcendent personality of God in every sentence. Only when he himself vouchsafes a human word, whenever and wherever he pleases, is my word 'about' God to be accepted as truth □ that means, only then is my word God's own word».

<sup>8</sup> W. Pannenberg, *Response to the Discussion*, in J. M. Robinson - J. B. Cobb, *New Frontiers in Theology*, vol. III, London 1967, pp. 251-252 «History is not the field of a finitude which is enclosed within itself, an "immanence" to which one could and indeed would have to oppose a "transcendence". History is far rather the ongoing collapse of the existing reality which is enclosed in its own "immanence" (because centered on itself). The power of the infinite is active and present in this collapse of the finite. Thus the infinite expresses itself in the first

transcendance même à réaliser l'union paradoxale du 'tout divers' avec le procès dérivé et du monde cosmique, et c'est – à – dire dans la personne en tant que telle : Jésus- Christ (comme l'avance la réputé définition de Calcédoine)<sup>1</sup>. L'antinomie du « et - et » (et Dieu et l'homme) apparaît dans sa plénitude en Christ et sera ultérieurement soulignée dans la dimension paradoxale de l'intention théologique même de la Reforme d'occident. La 'Parole' nous vient de là –haut, la philosophie s'articule du bas : Serait-ce telle la vision complexe de K. Barth<sup>2</sup> ? Dans un tel cas tout vraiment serait à revoir. Mais, il ne se pourrait-il pas que Barth sorte de cette problématique à deux pôles comme base et terrain de sa prospective ? Sa 'parole' naît de la même formulation philosophique 'libérale' – existentialisme et dialectique – qu'il renverse ensuite décidément ainsi<sup>3</sup>. Barth a accompli son élaboration chemin de maturation et de dépassement de la théologie libérale, partant de sa même expérience pastorale<sup>4</sup>.

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place negatively. But because the finite lives not by clinging to itself, but only in transformation of itself insofar the power of the infinite expresses itself also positively, as reconciliation and preservation of the finite in the midst of its collapse».

<sup>1</sup> D. Jenkins, *The Glory of Man*, London 1967, p. 55: «But the Chalcedonian Definition is a symbol of the discovery and assertion that in the purposes of the transcendent and independent God, and by the power of this God, a union has been achieved between that evolutionary product of cosmic dust which is a human being and that transcendent and wholly other purposeful personness who is God. Transcendent and independent personness is at one with derived, dependent and evolved personality whose whole basis can be reduced to that impersonal materiality out of which it has developed and on which it depends. And the result is the personal union of God and man who is himself the person, Jesus Christ. In this there is discovered the personal fulfilment both of God and of man. We have the fulfilment of the personness of God because God has achieved the expression of his purpose of love».

<sup>2</sup> G. Ferretti, *La teologia di fronte alla svolta ermeneutica*, in «Firmiana. Quaderni di teologia e pastorale», 1993 n° 2, p. 18: «L'acquisizione della natura ermeneutica, e quindi recettiva, della ragione filosofica, ha portato infine ad una quanto mai significativa variazione nella stessa tradizionale contrapposizione tra filosofia e teologia. Secondo tale contrapposizione, la filosofia doveva intendersi come una "costruzione che nasce dal basso", ovvero dalla sola ragione umana, e la teologia come "l'accoglienza di una rivelazione che viene dall'alto", e quindi come indissolubilmente legata alla fede. Una contrapposizione ripresa come ovvia da Karl Barth, e ancora ampiamente diffusa in campo teologico e filosofico. A nostro avviso, questa contrapposizione va abbandonata - o comunque profondamente rivista - dato che, in seguito alla svolta ermeneutica, sia la filosofia sia la teologia debbono essere pensate come impegnate nella ricezione/interpretazione di un'origine inesauribile, che in esse si rivela facendosi parola determinata».

<sup>3</sup> R. A. Muller, *The Place and Importance of Karl Barth in the Twentieth Century: A Review Essay*, (Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, California 91182) in «Internet» 1997, <http://members.aol.com/KatharenaE/private/Philo/Barth/barth.html>: «As David Tracy has argued, the place of Karl Barth in a theological paradigm of twentieth-century thought is within the liberal tradition. (1) To be sure, Barth and the theologians typically characterized as "neoorthodox" rejected much of the teaching of their liberal forebears, but this neoorthodoxy also held firmly to the existential and dialectical view of humanity that had arisen in the liberal context and to the liberal view that if the doctrines of traditional Christianity were to be made relevant to the modern world, they had to be reinterpreted in terms of the existential problems of modern man. In the light of these concerns, theology becomes a hermeneutical task designed, in Tracy's words, "to disclose the profoundly transformative meanings of the central Christian symbols." (2) The question of whether these "symbols" could remain functional in the context of historical and critical analysis tended to be overlooked or somewhat peremptorily set aside by recourse to language of "paradox," "mystery," and "scandal." (3) If this is a correct assessment of the place of Karl Barth in twentieth-century theology, it provides, together with our line of thought in the preceding paragraphs, a basis for assessing Barth's importance. Barth cannot be said to have the world-encompassing importance attributed to him by contemporary Barthians like T. F. Torrance--nor can Barth rightly be viewed as having set forth the basis for all future theology (another claim of contemporary Barthians). Barth and his fellow neoorthodox did provide an important corrective to idealistic liberalism by pointing forcefully toward the "negative elements of tragedy, of terror, indeed, of sin in human existence," and by redirecting the attention of liberalism to Scripture and to many traditional dogmas, particularly those concerned with the person and work of Christ. (4) This critique readied liberalism for the postmodern and "postliberal" world of the twentieth century and, in addition, gave many conservatives a new incentive to wrestle with the problems of modernity. But by not following through either with the critical and analytical insights of liberalism nor with the traditional and doctrinal rejoinder of the conservative and orthodox model, Barth and neoorthodoxy in general, have failed to become more than an eloquent, often existentially gripping, critique of extant theological models. The importance of such a theology must be limited to the historical moment in which and to which it spoke, and to the immediate results of its critique in the reshaping of the liberal and the orthodox theological models. Barth's own theology will remain a monument to the genius and ingenuity of its author, but it finally fails to become the normative "church dogmatics" that it intended to be».

(1) David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order*, 27. / (2) *Ibid.*, 29. / (3) *Ibid.* / (4) *Ibid.*, 28-29.

<sup>4</sup> R. Curtis, *Hans Küng on Karl Barth. A noted Catholic theologian believes that Barth has abandoned the Reformation position*, (most recently modified Monday, 23-Sep-96. It was published by Jubilee: A Magazine of the Church and Her People, July 1965, pp. 39 et seq., in «Internet» 1997, <http://village.ios.com/~rkcl1/kung.shtml>: «Seeing that the theology which he had been taught gave him little to say to his congregation, and had not provided his teachers with the vision to see their own un-Christian vacillations, Barth, a Calvinist pastor in the small Swiss town of Safenwil, reviewed his philosophy and theology along with a neighboring pastor and student-friend, Eduard Thurneysen. In 1919, this study issued in the historic *Der Römerbrief*, Barth's commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in which he contradicted the liberal theologians who considered Scripture no more than an account of human religious experience and whose historicism was concerned only with the historic personality of Christ. Barth asserted that in Scripture we find "divine thoughts about men, not human thoughts about God." The work fell like a bombshell on the theologians' playground and Neo-Orthodoxy was born, leading Protestant thought along a new road. (Later Barth gave to contemporary Protestantism a summa: the more than 10,000 pages of his *Church Dogmatics*.) In his studies as pastor at Safenwil, Barth was strongly influenced by the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and by modern philosophy. During the twenties, in partnership with Emil Brunner, Barth's thought took the form of a dialectical theology; Barth now reflects that during that period his theology was too much under the influence of dialectical philosophy. But it was during his "first conversion"--the rejection documented in *Der Römerbrief*--and this period of dialecticism that Barth became committed to modern existentialist thought. Finally in 1930, while conducting a seminar on Anselm of Canterbury, Barth discovered the analogy of faith, "a vital key, if not the key to an understanding of that whole process of thought that has impressed me more and more in my *Church Dogmatics* as the only one proper to theology." Barth calls this his "second conversion," and since that time his thought has developed consistently, save perhaps for aspects of his sacramental theology. Küng shows that Barth's theology since 1930, like Roman Catholic theology, is a theology which has an "open

## DES TRADITIONS ORIENTALES CHRETIENNE A L'ECO INTERRELIGIEUX. L'ANTINOMIE ET LA PERSPECTIVE DE LA THEOLOGIE PLURALISTE DANS LE DIALOGUE INTER – RELIGIEUX.

De l'intuition originaire oriental on arrivera à la maturation plus explicite sur la non conflictualité dans la christologie sophianique. On arrivera même à rejoindre l'horizon de l'intuition religieuse plus ample, dans le profond orient archaïque. La non conflictualité peut devenir 'joie du co-être' ou « ananda » de la perspective indienne originaire (avec Cit ou fils-conscience, et Sat ou Padre-être) <sup>1</sup>. Cette 'joie d'être pour l'autre' débouche de la 'nuit obscure' ou de ce qu'on pourrait appeler la 'tragédie' du « sortir de soi ». Ce sont les deux pôles du don par excellence de l'amour, pour ce qui est esquissé par quelque théologien oriental<sup>2</sup>. Le mystère du don est mystère d'amour entre vide de soi et joie de se retrouver avec l'autre. L'intérêt de cette allusion nous apparaît surtout se centrer sur un élément méthodologique fondamentale dans le 'faire la théologie'. En particulier, les références brièvement reprises ci-dessus semblent pouvoir être du tout acceptable dans la mesure où elles ne mettent pas en cause l'unicité du Christ en face des autres religions de l'humanité. Si on faisait les assemblages ci-dessus dans un sens strictement 'christologique', on s'exposerait immédiatement au soupçon du 'synchrétisme'. L'espace merveilleux de la pneumatologie nous permet, au contraire, de faire des assemblages interreligieux sans encourir dans ce type de doute. Le dialogue interreligieux avec les traditions de l'antique orient se relie avec l'approche antinomique de la théologie apophatique concernant l'exclusivisme christomoniste des chrétiens d'occident, partant de la même question historique sur Jésus, de la même perspective pneumatologique. Ainsi, on n'identifie pas simplement le Jésus de l'histoire et le Christ de la foi<sup>3</sup>. Le Christ de l'histoire est le nom symbolique du mystère reconnu comme tel

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system." Thus the "activist categories" of Barth are not basically different from the "dynamic categories" of Roman Catholic thought. And if the latter spring from a synthesis of Christian and Greek thought, we may say that the former spring from a synthesis of Barth's initial vision which led him to reject the theology of his school days and the existentialist thought which provided an alternative to Neo-Protestantism».

<sup>1</sup> F. Wilfred, *Beyond settled Foundations*, Trichy 1993, pp. 50-52: «TRINITY AND SACCIDANANDA. The object, or rather the subject, of contemplation in which both Christianity and Hinduism should meet is the mystery of God as Triune - Saccidananda. We see Monchanin focusing his attention not so much on the mysteries of Jesus' life - incarnation, death, resurrection, etc., as on the Trinity and particularly on the Holy Spirit. Well-versed both in the Eastern and Western traditions, Monchanin could discover a correspondence and similarity between the mysticism of Meister Eckhart, Ruysbroeck, Dionysius the Areopagite, and the mystical experience of seers and sages as found in the Upanishads. For him, the Hindu experience of God as Saccidananda was very rich and beautiful and this unique and sublime experience of God could find its fulfillment in the Christian understanding of the Trinity. It is a fulfillment that will happen as a result of the purification of both Hinduism and Christianity. As for Christianity is concerned, the classical understanding of person and creation must be rethought in relation to the experience of Hindu Saccidananda. The concept of person suggests a centripetal force, individualism, ego-centredness or ahamkara. In the Trinity there is no question of being for oneself but an 'esse ad alterum.'<sup>1</sup> Monchanin maintained that when faced with Hindu mysticism of the Vedanta one would be forced to rethink the traditional ontology. The esse must be redefined as co esse, and only this is helpful in understanding the mystery of the Trinity. On the other hand, Hinduism too must pass through a process of death and resurrection, in order to reach its crown and fulfillment in the doctrine of the Trinity. "The dialogue between Hindu mysticism and Christian mysticism must be located at this metaphysical and theological level: Nothing short of that dialogue can break the wall. Christian mysticism is trinitarian or it is nothing. Hindu thought, so deeply focussed on the oneness of the One, on the Kevalin in his kevalaDva cannot be sublimated into trinitarian thought without a crucifying dark night of the soul. It has to undergo a noetic metamorphosis, a passion of the Spirit."<sup>2</sup> To be able to contemplate the Divine in its mystery the way of renunciation and detachment - the way of sannyasi - is not enough. It is equally important that we transcend "the plane of concepts - our last and most dangerous idols."<sup>3</sup> A Christian who thus tries to meditate on the mystery of God beyond concepts, could concentrate on God the Father as Sat (being, reality), on the Son as Cit (consciousness) and on the Holy Spirit as Anarsla (joy, bliss). All this made Monchanin think of India as "the land of the Trinity".<sup>4</sup> In this Trinitarian vision Monchanin was particularly drawn to the mystery of the Spirit whom he considered to be pervasively present in the history of the world, of peoples, as well as in the inmost self of persons as life, light and joy. The Indian name Monchanin assumed is the expression of his attunement to the mystery of the Spirit. It means "the joy of the Supreme Formless one or Spirit". "The age of the Spirit", as he expressed in an article, "is not an age, but a state of interiority."<sup>5</sup>».

<sup>2</sup> C. I. Monchanin, "The Quest of the Absolute", *Cross Currents*, 19 (1969) 87. / <sup>2</sup> Ibid. / <sup>3</sup> Ibid., 85. / <sup>4</sup> J. Monchanin, *Écrits Spirituels*, 37. Quoted in J. Mattam, "Abbé Jules Monchanin and India", art. cit., 215. / <sup>5</sup> J. Monchanin, "Théologie et Mystique du Saint-Esprit", *Dieu Vivant*, 23 (1953), quoted in Henri De Lubac, *Images de l'Abbe' Monchanin*, op. cit., 116.

<sup>3</sup> S. Bulgakov, *Le Paraclét*, Paris 1944, p. 74: «Mais l'amour n'est pas seulement souffrance sacrificielle, anéantissement, renoncement, il est aussi joie, béatitude et triomphe. Et si le premier axiome de l'amour proclame qu'il n'est point d'amour sans sacrifice, le deuxième axiome, supérieur, car dernier, c'est qu'il n'y a point d'amour sans joie ni béatitude et, en général, qu'il n'y a point de béatitude hors l'amour. Étant tragique, l'amour, c'est de surmonter la tragédie; et c'est à cela que tient la puissance de l'amour. Il est une antinomie concrète qui consiste à se sacrifier et à se trouver par ce sacrifice. Cette béatitude de l'amour dans la Sainte-Trinité, consolation du Paraclét, est le Saint-Esprit».

par les chrétiens que les autres religions reconnaissent avec d'autres symboles et qui ne s'identifie pas seulement avec le 'Christ' <sup>1</sup>. Singulariser dans le symbole serait 'monisme', séparer en symboles isolés serait dualisme, ces deux positions se dépassent dans « l'advaita » : ni le même ni différent <sup>2</sup>. Ce paradoxe ou cette antinomie nous porte à la Trinité <sup>3</sup>. L'antinomie est qu'il s'agit et de nom différent et du même mystère <sup>4</sup>. Cette antinomie implique qu'aucune religion ne peut prétendre 'posséder exclusivement' ou d'avoir l'exclusivité du mystère, mais doit se déposséder du dépôt révélé en elle dans une 'kénose' dont le Christ de l'histoire nous a donné l'exemple.

## L'ANTINOMIE KENOTISANT DU 'LOGOS' DANS LE MYSTÈRE DE DIVIN

L'antinomie sera aussi le mode de revisiter les intentions théologiques sur le 'logos', de l'antinomisme du mystère même de Dieu. On dira que le verbe est 'tout' dans l'indissociabilité du divin et de l'humain, dans la leur originaire non conflictualité <sup>5</sup>. Nous savons combien cette 'synergie' d'ensemble entre Dieu et l'humanité a donné de l'embarras à la mentalité occidentale <sup>6</sup>. La radicale séparation entre le divin et l'humain ne pourra être 'conciliée' – en occident – sans la 'concentration christologique' <sup>7</sup>. Tout dépend, évidemment, dans ces allusions jusqu'où 'la radicale distinction' puisse devenir 'conflictualité' et jusqu'où l'antinomie valorise la 'diversité sans opposition agressive'. Il y aura qui reconnaîtra, tout à fait, dans la sagesse l'anticipation du Logos même – de l'ancien testament à la médiation chrétienne <sup>8</sup>. L'être avec antinomique donne la coupe inéluctable de la vue de sagesse <sup>9</sup>. Dans

<sup>1</sup> R. Panikkar, *A Christophany for our times*, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> R. Panikkar, *The Intrareligious Dialogue*, p. 22: «the ever transcending but equally ever humanly immanent mystery»; R. Panikkar, *Faith and Belief: On the Multireligious Experience*, p. 15: «(The mystery) also momentarily unveils itself in Christ in the last days — that is, with special historical amplitude»; R. Panikkar, *A Christophany for our times*, p. 7: «(The historic Christ) is human and divine without confusion of spheres of being and yet without any rupture whatsoever»; R. Panikkar, *The Intrareligious Dialogue*, p. 20: «Mystery —whom Christians recognize in Christ and other religions in other symbols— present and at work in every religion, usually in a dark and enigmatic way»; cfr etiam R. Panikkar, *Neither Christomonism nor Christodualism*, in. «Jeevadharma», 1994 n° 142, p. 338.

<sup>3</sup> Cfr R. Panikkar, *Indian Christian Theology*, in «Jeevadharma», 1997 n° 161, p. 320; R. Panikkar, *Neither Christomonism nor Christodualism*, in. «Jeevadharma», 1994 n° 142, p.338: «To affirm that there may be many Christs is not convincing for me nor, I would submit, for any orthodox Christian. To affirm that there is only one Christ (about whom we, at least, know his true" name) would amount to an equally unacceptable christomonism. Here is the christian theological locus for 'advaita'- and for the indic contribution to a more adequate wisdom for our times»; R. Panikkar, *The Unknown Christ of Hinduism*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>4</sup> R. Panikkar, *The Unknown Christ of Hinduism*, p 24.

<sup>5</sup> R. Panikkar, *Neither Christomonism nor Christodualism*, in. «Jeevadharma», 1994 n° 142, p. 337: «"The Unknown Christ of Hinduism" is not 'another' Christ, and yet it is not the 'same' Christ Christians know. It is unknown to them - and known to the Hindus under other names, aspects and dimensions of that mystery for which the Christian has no other name than Christ. So I am not saying that the "Hindu Christ" is the 'same' as the Christian Christ." I am defending that, that Mystery, which the Christian cannot but call Christ, has aspects, manifestations, attributes, and what not, unknown to the Christian, that other people, believe are' "revealed" to them and for which they give different names».

<sup>6</sup> В. Соловьёв / V. Solov'ëv, *Духовныя основы жизни / Die geistige Grundlagen des Lebens*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, Т. III / *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe*, В. II, Брюссель 1956 / Freiburg in Breisgau 1964, стр. 355 / S. 39: «Das Erstgeburtsrecht des Seins kommt nicht den einzelnen Teilen, sondern dem Ganzen zu. Der absolute Urfang und die Quelle jeglichen Seins ist die absolute Ganzheit alles Seienden, das heißt: Gott. Diese Ganzheit, des All, die in ihrem Ansichte in [sama po sebe] in der unveränderlichen Ruhe der Ewigkeit verweilt, enthüllt und offenbart sich in dem allvereinigenden Sinn der Welt, so daß dieser Sinn der direkte Ausdruck oder das Wort (der λόγος) der Gottheit, offenbarer und wirkender Gott ist. Durch ihn wird jedes wirkliche Sein bestimmt; von dem kleinsten Stoffteilchen, das zu anderen Teilchen gravitiert, bis hinzu den komplizierten Tiergattungen, die in der Ernährung andere Organismen verschlingen oder sich im geschlechtlichen Akt mit ihres gleichen vereinigen, überall offenbart sich und wirkt der ewige Sinn des Seins, das uranfängliche Wort des anfanglosen Gottes. Dieses Wort verbietet jedes getrennte, zusammenhanglose existieren, mit unzerreißbaren Banden vereinigt es das eine mit dem anderen und ein jedes mit allen, und aus der chaotischen Vielheit bildet es die eine Welt. "Im Anfang war das Wort, und das Wort war bei Gott, und Gott war das Wort. Dieses war im Anfang bei Gott. Alles ist durch Dasselbe geworden, und ohne Dasselbe ist nichts geworden, was geworden ist" <sup>1</sup>».

<sup>7</sup> Vedere l'impostazione di questa prospettiva -per quanto ha potuto darne l'autore di queste pagine- nello studio *Teologie a confronto*, vol. 1, *Sponde lontane*, Vicenza 1982, Parte I, cap. 1.

<sup>8</sup> P. Tillich, *Ultimate Concern*, London 1962, pp. 121-122: «And this relates also to science. What science can do is to give us insights into handling realities, including some levels of our psychological makeup. That is quite possible, but science (and here I think I would contradict our guest professor) cannot give us wisdom, because wisdom is, if we consider the wisdom literature of Greece and the Old Testament, not a technical achievement, but a divine power which tries to show us the ultimate problems of our existence. Later it was termed the Logos. The Logos is, so to speak, the successor of Old Testament wisdom».

<sup>9</sup> P. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, London 1968, vol. III, p. 272: «Wisdom can be distinguished from objectifying knowledge (sapientia from scientia) by its ability to manifest itself beyond the cleavage of subject and object. The biblical imagery describing Wisdom and Logos as being "with" God an "with" men makes this point quite obvious. Theonomous knowledge is Spirit-determined Wisdom. But as the Spirit-determined language of theonomy does not dispense with the language which is determined by the cleavage between subject and object, so Spirit determined cognition does not contradict the knowledge which is gained within the subject-object structure of encountering reality».

la considération sophianique, le Logos prend toute sa stature de ‘Verbe’ désormais réexposé dans les problématiques plus actuelles. La totalité non raisonnable, mais symboliquement évocable, est le verbe <sup>1</sup>. La ‘source’ de ce qui nous rend pleinement humain, le ‘verbe’, se fait racine de divinisation <sup>2</sup>. Ainsi se dessine la personification paradoxale de la sophia <sup>3</sup>, personification du message (verbe-parole-sagesse), tissu nerveux de l’humanité dans son auto-gestion radicalement mûrie... Le Verbe, la Parole totale ou le langage de toutes les paroles, est le mystère divin non absolu <sup>4</sup>. La christologie sophianique exposera son intuition dans la confrontation entre Christ et Antichrist : ou c’est – à – dire autour de la falsification intrinsèque du Christ. La différence entre Christ et Antichrist est – dans le surpassement- le non absolu que veut être divin ultime. L’Empereur universel veut être « la parole ultime ». Christ – au contraire – le verbe comme langage vivant : c’est – à – dire un continu « début » de réalisation vécue, organique : un réseau en perspective <sup>5</sup>. Dans le devenir langage, le verbe se de-absolutise. Dans le « se faire parole définitive » dans la conformité au divin, l’Empereur universel s’absolutise illusoirement<sup>6</sup>. Pour l’orient chrétien, ce sera l’antinomie ou la non correspondance du mystère divin avec la logique humaine qui implique une perspective fondamentale de toute la vue chrétienne : le « se vider » de soi-même ou de la propre consistance solidement et logiquement cohérent. La voie apophatique est voie de la ‘kénose’ divine <sup>7</sup>. Ce « faire le vide de soi » est caractéristique intrinsèque de l’amour divin, non un type de réductionnisme du divin à l’étroitesse humaine, comme l’intention occidentale romain

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W. Kasper, *Jesus der Christus*, Mainz 1975, S. 224: «Wenn Jesus Christus die persongewordene Weisheit und die Zusammenfassung und das Ziel aller Wirklichkeit ist, dann empfängt die Wirklichkeit als ganze wie jedes einzelne Wirkliche von ihm her und auf ihn hin seinen endgültigen Platz und seinen endgültigen Sinn. Dann muß aber auch, was Mitte, Grund und Ziel der Existenz Jesu ist, seine Sohnschaft, sein Sein für Gott und für die Menschen, in verborgener und doch wirksamer Weise alle Wirklichkeit zuinnerst bestimmen. Eine solche universale Christologie besagt zunächst, daß man Schöpfung und Erlösung, Natur und Gnade, Christentum und Welt nicht dualistisch gegenüber nebeneinander stellen darf».

<sup>1</sup> В. Соловьёв / V. Solov'ëv, *Духовные основы жизни / Die geistige Grundlagen des Lebens*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, Т. III / *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe*, В. II, Брюссель 1956 / Freiburg in Breisgau 1964, стр. 355 / S. 39.

<sup>2</sup> П. Флоренский, *Столп и утверждение истины*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, Т. IV, / P. Florenskij, *La colonna e il fondamento della verità*, Москва 1917 / Milano 1974, стр. 326 / p. 388: «La Sofia è la Grande Radice della creatura totale cfr. Rom. 8, 22: *πάσα ἡ κτίσις*, cioè il creato tutto integrale e non semplicemente il tutto). Per lei il creato penetra nell'intimo della vita triadica e ottiene la vita eterna dall'unica Fonte della vita. La Sofia è l'essenza originaria del creato, <sup>1</sup> l'Amore creatore di Dio “che è stato riversato nei nostri cuori per mezzo dello Spirito Santo” (Rom. 5, 5). Proprio per questo l'amore divino è il suo vero Io divinizzato, il suo “cuore”, come l'amore intertrinitario è l'Essenza divina. Perché tutto esiste veramente solo in quanto partecipa del Dio-amore, del la Sorgente dell'essere e della verità. Se la creatura si stacca dalla propria radice, l'attende fatalmente la morte; “perché”, come dice la Sapienza stessa, “chi trova me trova la vita e ottiene il favore di Jahvè, ma chi si allontana da me fa torto a se stesso: tutti coloro che odiano me, amano la morte” (Prov. 8, 35-36)».

<sup>3</sup> La concezione patristica, particolarmente di Gregorio Niseno, dell' essere ‘ uno del creato è spiegata da Antonij (Chrapovickij), arciv di Volynija, in *Nravstv. idei dogmata cerksi, Opera omnia*, vol. 2, ed. 2, Pietroburgo 1911. V.(A.) TROICKIJ, *Triedinstvo božestva i edinstvo čelovečestva*, Mosca 1912 e in ‘ *Golos Cerki* ', 1912, n. 10. Questa concezione sta alla base delle opere di S.(N.) BULGAKOV, *Filosofija chozjajstva*, parte I, Mosca 1912, della dottrina sulla Chiesa di V. Solov'ëv, ecc. Tutta la storia del peccato, del piano della salvezza, della redenzione e salvezza, la dottrina dei sacramenti, ecc., ottengono alla luce di questa concezione un significato reale, mentre al di fuori di essa diventano formule vuote.

<sup>4</sup> П. Флоренский, *Столп и утверждение истины*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, Т. IV, / P. Florenskij, *La colonna e il fondamento della verità*, Москва 1917 / Milano 1974, стр. 383 / pp. 446-447: «Nella Sofia (di Novgorod) essi vedono la personificazione dell'attributo divino astratto della sapienza, non l'ipostasi personale della Sapienza di Dio. Questo è vero perché la Sofia non è ipostasi nel senso stretto del termine e non è identica al Verbo. L'iconografia conosce una quantità di personificazioni del mare, dei monti, del vento, della neve, del deserto, del cielo e della terra, del cosmos, del Giordano, del sole e della luna, della notte e del mattino, della materia celeste, della colomba, dell'inferno, del Mar Rosso, dell'Egitto, di Nazaret, di Betlemme, di Gerusalemme, della melodia, della forza, dell'orgoglio, del pentimento, della giovinezza, *Διακοσμήνη καὶ ἡ Ἐλεμοσύνη*, le virtù, *Προφητεία, Σοφία*, della sinagoga, della Chiesa, ecc.; in una moltitudine di icone, miniature, affreschi e simili <sup>1</sup>».

<sup>5</sup> N. POKROVSKIJ, *Evangelië v pamiatnikach ikonografi i iskusstva*, cit., F.(I.) BUSLAEV, *Istor. očerki*, Pietroburgo 1861, vol. II, sulle miniature del Salterio di Ugli □; E.(K.) REDIN, *Anti □nye bogi (planety) v licevnyh rukopisiach so □inenija Koz-my Indikoplova*, in ‘ *Zap. klas. otd. Imp. Rus. Arch. Obščestva* ', vol. I, Pietroburgo 1904, pp. 33-43. Vi sono ricordate altre personificazioni (Galgala, Gerico, Gaj, Hevol, la Fonte, il monte Hemschacor, *Εἰρήσις, Φρόνησις, Μεγαλοφυκία*, ecc.) e poi vi sono studiate le personificazioni dei pianeti: della luna, del sole, del Crono, di Afrodite, di Zeus, di Ares e di Ermes.

<sup>6</sup> В. Соловьёв / V. Solov'ëv, *Духовные основы жизни / Die geistige Grundlagen des Lebens*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, Т. III / *Deutsche Gesamtausgabe*, В. II, Брюссель 1956 / Freiburg in Breisgau 1964, стр. 368-369 / S. 91.

<sup>7</sup> В. Соловьёв / V. Solov'ëv, *Чтения о Богочеловечестве*, in idem, *Собрание сочинений*, Т. III / *Lectures on Godmanhood*, Брюссель 1956 / London 1968, стр. 114-116 / p. 154: «In the divine organism of Christ, the acting, unifying beginning, the beginning which expresses the unity of the unconditionally-extant one, obviously is the Word of Logos. The unity of the second kind, the produced unity, in Christian theosophy bears the name of Sophia. If in the absolute we differentiate in general the absolute as such, i.e., as the unconditionally-extant One, from its content, essence or idea, then we find the direct expression of the first in the Logos, and of the second in Sophia, which is thus the expressed, realized idea. And as the extant One, differing from its own idea is at the same time one with it, so Logos, too, differing from Sophia, is eternally connected with her. Sophia is God's body, the matter of Divinity, <sup>1</sup> permeated with the beginning of divine unity. Christ, who realized that unity in Himself or is the bearer of it, as the integral divine organism “universal and at the same time individual” is both Logos and Sophia».

le propose <sup>1</sup>. Nous sommes diamétralement aux antipodes des polémiques ‘occidentales’ sur la kénose, comme toujours illustrée dans les années ’90 <sup>2</sup>. Emblématique apparaît la référence à peine mentionnée - dans la note citée - de l’appartenance divine comme ‘armes’ dans les mains du Christ pour vaincre en ‘policier’ les désordres humains. Pour la voie officielle

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<sup>1</sup> A.J. Maas, *Kenosis*, ((Transcribed by Richard R. Pettys, Jr.), in AA. VV., *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Volume VIII (online edition) in «Internet» 2004, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08617a.htm>: «Catholic teaching. According to Catholic theology, the abasement of the Word consists in the assumption of humanity and the simultaneous occultation of the Divinity. Christ's abasement is seen first in His subjecting Himself to the laws of human birth and growth and to the lowliness of fallen human nature. His likeness, in His abasement, to the fallen nature does not compromise the actual loss of justice and sanctity, but only the pains and penalties attached to the loss. These fall partly on the body, partly on the soul, and consist in liability to suffering from internal and external causes. As to the body, Christ's dignity excludes some bodily pains and states. God's all-preserving power inhabiting the body of Jesus did not allow any corruption; it also prevented disease or the beginning of corruption. Christ's holiness was not compatible with decomposition after death, which is the image of the destroying power of sin. In fact, Christ had the right to be free from all bodily pain, and His human will had the power to remove or suspend the action of the causes of pain. But He freely subjected Himself to most of the pains resulting from bodily exertion and adverse external influences, e.g. fatigue, hunger, wounds, etc. As these pains had their sufficient reason in the nature of Christ's body, they were natural to Him. Christ retained in Him also the weaknesses of the soul, the passions of His rational and sensitive appetites, but with the following restrictions: (a) Inordinate and sinful motions are incompatible with Christ's holiness. Only morally blameless passions and affections, e.g. fear, sadness, the share of the soul in the sufferings of the body, were compatible with His Divinity and His spiritual perfection. (b) The origin, intensity, and duration of even these emotions were subject to Christ's free choice. Besides, He could prevent their disturbing the actions of His soul and His peace of mind. To complete His abasement, Christ was subject to His Mother and St. Joseph, to the laws of the State and the positive laws of God; He shared the hardships and privations of the poor and the lowly».

<sup>2</sup> Ch. Buntin, *THE EMPTY GOD. A Biblical and Theological Answer to the False Doctrine of Kenosis*, in «Internet» 1996, <http://www.bible.org/docs/theol/kenosis.htm>: «An increasingly prevalent teaching in evangelical circles, particularly in charismatic circles, is the doctrine of Kenosis. This false teaching is drawn from impure wells, it is dangerous because of the other false doctrines it leads to, and it flies in the face of the heart of Christian teaching. What is it? The doctrine teaches that the Messiah, in order to assume the form of a servant and become incarnate (into human flesh), had to give up some, several, or even all the powers and attributes of God and "live as a mere man." The advocates of this heresy, in an effort to assume an orthodox posture, try to say that the Son somehow "remains God," though He has given up all parts of that being. This teaching, which denies so much of the heart of the orthodox faith, comes from the misinterpretation and misconstruction of one Greek word. This word, and the doctrine it describes, refer to the deep, mysterious, but vitally important passage of Philippians 2:5-8, and especially in verse 7, where it says Christ "made himself of no reputation," or "emptied himself." The word in the original is *ekenosen*, from the root word *kenoo*, which can mean "to empty." The other references to the word are Romans 4:14, where the meaning is "made void," 1 Corinthians 1:17, where it means "of none effect," 1 Corinthians 9:15, where it means "make void," and 2 Corinthians 9:3, where it means "to be in vain." These references all refer to abstract principles, such as faith, preaching, or boasting--none of them refer to a person, or even to an object. Therefore, the use of the word as it is used in Philippians 2:7 is unique. The question, which shall be repeated later is "of what did Christ empty Himself?" The teachers of Kenosis say that what Christ did was to "empty Himself of all power." .... I. The Doctrine of Kenosis / A. Classic Kenotic Teaching. 1. "About the middle of the nineteenth century a new form of Christology made its appearance in the Kenotic theories."(2) This is how Berkhof introduces the subject. He then delineates three forms of Kenotic teaching--the first, and least offensive, seems to fit the general view: "Thomasius distinguishes between the absolute and essential attributes of God . . . and His relative attributes, which are not essential to the Godhead, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience; and maintains that the Logos while retaining His divine self-consciousness, laid the latter aside, in order to take unto Himself veritable human nature."(3) 2. "The essence of the original kenotic view is stated clearly by J. M. Creed. "The Divine Logos by His Incarnation divested Himself of His divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence, so that in His incarnate life the divine Person is revealed and solely revealed through a human consciousness."(4) 3. Charles Hodge classes this view under Modern Forms of the Doctrine [Christology], and includes it under a class of doctrines called Theistical Christology taught by various German theological liberals of that era.(5) One form of the view is as follows. "...that the Eternal Logos, by a process of self-limitation, divested Himself of all his divine attributes. He ceased to be omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. He reduced Himself, so to speak, to the dimensions of a man."(6) III. A Critical Refutation, from Scripture and from Evangelical Scholars, of the things implied and taught by the Kenosis Doctrine.... The theologians who crafted Kenotic doctrine were trying to deal with two problems. The first problem was in how to deal with those texts of scripture (as used by the cults) which seem to indicate that Christ was less than fully God, yet do justice to the obvious Biblical teaching that He was "Very God of Very God." The second problem was posed by their understanding that He lived His life in submission to the will of the Father, and largely as a man with a full indwelling of the Holy Spirit. They could not reconcile that in their minds with His full deity. The problem with these teachers was that they were theological liberals--they did not accept the verbal, plenary, inspiration of the Bible. Because of this, they crafted an erroneous philosophical theological answer, and ignored the fact that the problems were already solved by scripture, and had been fully worked out by the teachers and leaders of the early church during the period from A.D. 250-451. In their effort to improve on the Council of Chalcedon, they created many more problems than those they sought to solve--and did not really solve what they had originally perceived to be problems in the orthodox faith. If we were to make an illustration of Jesus as if He were a policeman going under cover in a bad neighborhood, the Kenosis doctrine has the policeman leaving his weapons at home, along with his badge and other symbols of authority. He can call on headquarters for help, but he himself is helpless and defenseless. The orthodox teaching has the policeman himself as a "lethal weapon," he is a martial arts expert who can kill with a blow--he is skilled on the level that he can reach within a man's chest and pull out his still-beating heart--he can defeat multiple opponents. He can leave His I.D. , badge, uniform, etc., behind just like cop number one, but he cannot cease to be the walking weapon that he is. He looks normal, he appears as helpless as the first policeman, but he has the ability within himself to defend himself. He might choose to call for help; he might even choose to allow himself to be shackled, hurt or killed for the good of the mission--but he has the ability within himself to defeat his enemies. Raise that illustration, and the powers of the second policeman to infinity, and the illustration shows the difference in the two doctrines».

1. Walter Martin's last published writing was a refutation of apotheosis in the book *The Agony of Deceit* , (Moody Press, 1990). Included in that same book is an article by Dr. Rod Rosenblatt entitled *Who Do TV Preachers Say That I Am?*, which refutes, among other things, the teaching of Kenosis. / 2. L. Berkhof, *Systematic Theology* , (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1940) pg 327. / 3. *Ibid.* / 4. Ralph P. Martin, *Kenosis*, *The New Bible Dictionary* (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973), pg 6.89 / 5. Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology* vol. II/III, (Reprint by Wm B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1977) pp 428-440. / 6. Dr. Rod Rosenblatt, *Who Do TV Preachers Say That I Am? The Agony of Deceit* , (Moody Press, 1990) pp 114-115.

romaine, la kénose demeure une ‘humiliation humaine’ de Dieu en Christ <sup>1</sup>. L’abaissement humain s’accomplit à cause de la situation humaine de fracture avec Dieu. Nous sommes en plein dans la conflictualité entre le divin et l’humain dans la position de l’occident. Entre temps, pour certains auteurs russes récents, la ‘kénose’ appartient intrinsèquement au mystère divin de l’incarnation <sup>2</sup>. Il y a des auteurs occidentaux qui ont senti le point faible d’une ‘kénose extrinsèque’ : c’est – à –dire un abandon d’omnipotence et des attributs ‘surhumains’ (pour les récupérer plus impétueusement après). Voici où on perçoit le passage entre ‘malheur, seuil de transcendance’ et ‘kénose, révélation du paradoxe’. Ce dernier pourrait exprimer une apparente ‘conflictualité de Dieu contre soi-même’ face à la ‘non conflictualité’ entre Dieu et le monde’ !... N’importe quelle kénose extrinsèque risque d’assumer cette valence d’agressivité de Dieu contre soi-même à cause de son insertion incarnationnelle dans le monde. Après ‘un Dieu du sadisme’ dans les punitions induites, on aurait un ‘Dieu masochiste’ dans la gestion de ses rapports avec l’humanité. On dit que ces deux dérivations de l’âme humaine ne soient pas du tout étrangères l’une de l’autre. La même philosophie, laissant de côté une vision de l’absolu ‘en soit’ ou prenant les distances de la pensée totalisante (tout dans la propre autosuffisance) s’oriente parfois vers la qualité relationnelle d’une ‘théologie de la kénose’. On ne sort pas de la difficulté sinon ‘de l’intérieur’ de la vie divine. La kénose devient événement divin intrinsèque. Elle consiste dans le fait que Christ

<sup>1</sup> J. Ratzinger, *Interreligious Dialogue and Jewish-Christian Relations*, in «Internet» 2005, <http://www.geocities.com/romcath1/DialogJudaism.html>: «But this very God who has become tangible is wholly mysterious. His self-chosen humiliation, his "kenosis," is a new form, as it were, of the cloud of mystery in which he hides and at the same time shows himself. (\*) For what paradox could be greater than the very fact that God is vulnerable and can be killed? The Word that the incarnate and crucified Christ is always immeasurably transcends all human words. Consequently, God's kenosis is itself the place where the religions can come into contact without arrogant claims to domination. The Platonic Socrates underscores the connection between truth and defenselessness, truth and poverty, especially in the *Apology* and the *Crito*. Socrates is credible because in taking the part of "the god" he gets neither rank nor possession, but, on the contrary, is thrust into poverty and, finally, into the role of the accused. (\*\*) Poverty is the truly divine form in which truth appears: in its poverty it can demand obedience without alienation».

(\*) Cf. B. Stubenrauch, *Dialogisches Dogma: Der christliche Auftrag zur interreligiösen Begegnung* (Freiburg, 1995), especially 84-96. / (\*\*\*) Cf., for example, *Apologia* 31 c: "And indeed I believe that I can produce a sufficient witness to the fact that I speak the truth, and that is my poverty"; *Crito* 48 c-d.

<sup>2</sup> С. Булгаков / S. Bulgakov, *Агнец Божий / Le Verbe incarné*, Париж 1933 / Paris 1943, стр. 246-247 / pp. 145-146: “L’idée directrice ne sera pas la “préhension” par la Divinité de l’humanité, ni Son “installation” dans la chair humaine, ce sera Son abaissement jusqu’à l’homme, l’humiliation volontaire de la Divinité, Sa kénose <sup>1</sup>. “Le Verbe s’est fait chair”: l’incarnation est, avant tout, un acte kénotique. Afin que l’essence humaine puisse s’unir à l’essence divine, sans se dissoudre ni s’abolir, la Divinité doit s’abaisser, descendre jusqu’à elle <sup>2</sup>. L’incarnation de Dieu commence par la descente du Fils de Dieu depuis les cieux, pour s’achever par Son ascension au ciel. Nous devons prendre conscience du principe kénotique avec une acuité et une netteté qui étaient loin d’être propres à l’époque classique des discussions christologiques, singulièrement sur ce point (hors les assertions dispersées de saint Cyrille ou de saint Hilaire). L’admirable mérite de la “théologie kénotique” a été de mettre en avant ce principe (en Allemagne, puis en Angleterre). Elle représente ainsi le plus important courant de pensée christologique depuis les conciles œcuméniques <sup>3</sup>». <sup>1</sup> L’idée de la kénose du Christ est fort clairement exprimée dans la prière de la préface de la liturgie de saint Basile le Grand: “(Il) n’a pas retenu avidement d’être égal à Toi, Dieu et Père! mais étant Dieu suréternel, Il apparut sur terre et vécut avec les hommes: et S’incarna de la Vierge sainte, S’humilia, ayant pris la condition d’esclave, étant conforme au corps de notre humilité, afin de nous rendre conformes à l’image de Sa gloire.” / <sup>2</sup> Dans le mandement des Patriarches Orientaux, art. VII, nous lisons cette définition de l’incarnation: “nous croyons que le Fils de Dieu, Notre-Seigneur Jésus-Christ, *Se dévasta Lui-même*, c’est-à-dire qu’Il prit sur Lui, dans Sa propre hypostase, la chair de l’homme, conçue dans les entrailles de la Vierge Marie par l’opération du Saint-Esprit, et S’inhumanisa.” Saint Cyrille exprime parfois un principe purement kénotique qui le conduit à l’idée de la théanthropie, bien qu’il s’en écarte par la suite. Voici, par exemple, ce que nous lisons en explication au quatrième anathème: “Étant égal de Dieu, le Verbe qui tire de Lui son origine n’a pas retenu avidement d’être égal de Dieu, comme il est écrit (*Phil.*, II, 6), mais Il s’est soumis à une dévotion volontaire et condescendit par sa volonté jusqu’à notre ressemblance, sans cesser d’être ce qu’Il est, et *restant Dieu et ne méprisant point la mesure de l’humanité*. C’est pourquoi tout est Sien: et le divin et l’humain: car, *où Se serait-Il humilié, s’Il avait eu honte de la mesure humaine* et s’Il s’était écarté de l’humain, qui L’aurait contraint, comme par nécessité et coercition, à être semblable à nous? Ainsi, tous les discours évangéliques, qu’ils désignent l’humain ou le divin, nous les rapportons à une seule personne “, etc. (*Act. Conc. OEc.* II, 55). / <sup>3</sup> Il n’entre pas dans notre dessein de faire un exposé historique de théologie dénommée kénotique (on le trouve chez Bruce: *The humiliation of Christ*, 1905, et chez Bensusan: *Die Lehre von der Kenose*, 1903, ainsi que dans les articles sur la kénose du *Dict. cath. dogm.*, dans le *Dict. cath. apol.*, dans la *R. E.*). Les représentants les plus marquants de la kénotique sont: son fondateur, Thomasius: *Christi Person und Werk* 3 A, 1886 et autres œuvres; B. F. Hess: *Die Lehre von der Person Christi*, etc., 1856; *Christi Person und Werk*, I-III, 1870-1887 (le point de vue le plus extrême sur l’humiliation du Christ); Th. Liebner: *Die christl. Dogmatik*, etc., 1894; Ebhart: *Die chr. Dogmatik*, 1852; *Die Chr. Glaubenslehre*, 1861 Godet: *Comm. sur l’Evangile de saint Jean*, II, 1877, Bonifas: *Hist. des dogmes*, II, 1886, Grétilat: *Exposé de théologie systématique*, IV; *Dogmatique*, II, 1890; Bovon: *Dogm. Chrét.* Parmi les critiques, Dorner, dans plusieurs ouvrages: *Entw. d. Lehre von der Person I. Chr.*, II, 2; *St. der kirchl. Glaubenslehre*, I-II, etc. Le monde anglo-saxon compte de nombreux représentants de la doctrine kénotique, au XXe siècle (je n’ai pu malheureusement accéder à tous, Mackintosh, Sanday, Gifford, Forsyth, Mason, Powell, Forrest, Ad. Brown, Weston, Moorhouse, Hall, W. Bright, Rashdall et d’autres). Ici, elle perd jusqu’à un certain point la profondeur dogmatique qui lui est propre dans la Théologie allemande et elle prend les traits du rationalisme et du libéralisme, parfaitement étrangers à celle-ci, plutôt orthodoxe; c’est pourquoi on la range d’ordinaire sous la bannière du “modernisme” (voir, par exemple, la brochure polémique de S. H. Scott: *Anglocatholicism and Reunion*, 1923). La théologie kénotique mériterait indubitablement qu’on lui consacrerait une monographie.

offre la pleine divinisation du premier moment dans lequel il assume notre humanité et dans le même temps fuit de tout ce qui exprime une 'auto - déification'. Ce paradoxe se révèle non dans le 'mode d'opérer du Christ', mais pose plus radicalement la question 'Qui est Jésus – Christ' ? Dans le sens expérimentalement concret. Il faudra clarifier ce qu'aura été la dimension propre de l'humiliation jusqu'à la mort : une humiliation stratégique de Dieu dans ses apparences humaines ou une humiliation – paradoxe sur ce qui signifie le divin pour l'humain. Nous avons déjà pu prendre acte que la 'souffrance', 'la tragédie', la 'compassion' ne sont pas des 'modes de faire' mais une qualité intrinsèque du mystère divin.