Hilary Putnam

Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1975.

CONTENTS
Introduction, pp. vii-xvii
1.    
Language and philosophy, pp. 1-32
2.     The analytic and synthetic (1962), pp. 33-69
3.     Do true assertions correspond to reality? pp. 70-84
4.     Some issues in the theory of grammar (1961), pp. 85-106
5.     The ‘innateness hypothesis’ and explanatory models in linguistics (1967), pp. 107-116
6.     How not to talk about meaning: Comments on J. J. C. Smart (1965), pp. 117-131
7.     Review of The concept of a person, pp. 132-138
8.     Is semantics possible? (1970), pp. 139-152
9.     The refutation of conventionalism (1974), pp. 153-191
10.   Reply to Gerald Massey, pp. 192-195
11.   Explanation and reference (1973), pp. 196-214
12.   The meaning of ‘meaning’ (1975), pp. 215-271
13.   Language and reality, pp. 272-290
14.   Philosophy and our mental life, pp. 291-303
15.   Dreaming and ‘depth grammar’ (1962), pp. 304-324
16.   Brains and behaviour, pp. 325-341
17.   Other minds (1972), pp. 342-361
18.   Minds and machines (1960), pp. 362-385
19.   Robots: machines or artificially created life? (1964), pp. 386-407
20.   The mental life of some machines (1967), pp. 408-428
21.   The nature of mental states (1967), pp. 429-440
22.   Logical positivism and the philosophy of mind (1969), pp. 441-451